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Hidden Hunger in Peacetime and Wartime: 
Retailoring the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ to Food-
Power Discourses in Burundi and North Korea, 
Between International Politics and International Law 
 Riccardo Vecellio Segate† 
ABSTRACT: The framework known as ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
(“R2P”) has afforded legal endorsement and codification to the 
doctrine that States hold responsibility under public international 
law for the protection of their own citizens and of those who 
reside within their prescriptive jurisdiction. This holds true in 
peacetime and wartime alike, and it is shaped by an understanding 
of ‘security’ which increasingly calls for comprehensive and 
multifaceted assessments (human security) to replace the 
traditional ones centred on military protection. Within the human-
security paradigm, the right to food stands at the forefront of a 
reconceptualization which proceeds beyond the quantity of 
available (or accessible) food, up to scrutinise its nutritional value 
more pertinently, and human capabilities in context. ‘Hidden 
hunger’—the chronic insufficiency of nutrients intake that 
victimises hundreds of millions of children worldwide—is 
currently dismayingly unaddressed in legal scholarship, despite 
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representing a proven trigger of violent spirals which turn 
countries to conflict and frustrate their Gross Domestic Product 
(“GDP”). It is therefore essential to analyse the chances to 
successfully invoke the R2P framework as to intervene in 
countries whose ruling classes can be identified as the major cause 
of protracted hidden hunger (either because those regimes keep 
their population in a condition of civil conflict, or due to those 
rulers’ individual greed and unconstrained authoritarianism). The 
case studies of Burundi and North Korea respectively are 
enlightening to this end, and surprisingly illustrate that whereas, 
strictly legally, the R2P provides (modest) enhanced room for 
perpetrators accountability, its political impact restricts the 
options available for the international community to argue that the 
wilful production (or passive acceptance) of hidden hunger 
violates the internationally recognised ‘right to food’, and 
intervene accordingly whenever necessary. 
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I. Introduction 
Once inside, there is an unnerving quiet to the children’s ward. 
The healthier babies cry, but many just stare blankly. It’s not 
immediately clear if their eyes look too big or their faces too 
small. Malnourishment can have very few tell-tale signs to an 
untrained eye — perhaps just a paleness, a smallness. As the scale 
continues, some children have lost hair or had their hair turn 
orange, some have swollen bellies, or no belly to speak of, or 
bones sticking out through wilted skin. Some of them have aged 
faces, with skin that wrinkles when they cry.1 
 
 1 Jane Ferguson, How We Got the Images You Weren’t Meant to See in Yemen, PBS 
NEWSHOUR, (July 3, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/reporting-in-yemen-
the-city-that-has-fallen-off-a-cliff [https://perma.cc/CF4A-HKFH] (discussing the 
Author’s experience reporting from Yemen, which won her several international prizes for 
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The purpose of this study is to provide an innovative analytical 
framework to compare the cases of Burundi and North Korea in 
relation to potential claims of non-compliance with their 
responsibility to protect (“R2P”) their populations. This comparison 
will be performed by engaging with ongoing discourses on the right 
to food (“RTF”), scrutinised primarily—although not exclusively—
from an international human rights law (“IHRL”) perspective, and 
in its unavoidable interfaces with international humanitarian law 
(“IHL”),2  international criminal law (“ICL”),3  and general public 
international law (“PIL”). More accurately, this article wonders 
whether the international community is entitled to invoke a ‘breach’ 
of the R2P owing to States’ non-compliance with their duty to 
address their populations’ RTF, with particular reference to long-
lasting ‘hidden hunger’ (a sub-typology of perpetually harmful state 
of chronic malnutrition 4 ). Indeed, whilst the controversial R2P 
concept applies to man-made (or man-worsened) situations of 
manifest, acute hunger—and even in these situations, international 
politics may hinder its effectiveness—its applicability to pervasive, 
underground malnutrition due to a State’s grave hindrance or 
omissions is far less straightforward a conjecture. 
To answer this interrogative, several steps will need to be 
accomplished. Part II will inspect the RTF, especially in its 
qualitative component linked to the fighting against the so-called 
hidden hunger,5  and report insightful exemplifications from Israel 
 
investigative war journalism) (emphasis added).  
 2 See ILIAS BANTEKAS & LUTZ OETTE, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW AND 
PRACTICE 658–59 (2d ed. 2013). 
 3  “[V]iolations of the right to housing, food, education, work, health or other ESCR 
[ . . . ] can give raise to a [S]tate’s violation of ESCR as well as individual criminal 
responsibility for war crimes.” Evelyne Schmid, War Crimes Related to Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 71 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 523, 540 (2011). 
 4 HANS KONRAD BIESALSKI, HIDDEN HUNGER 2 (2013). Overweight and 
underweight can both be symptomatic of this malaise, which is not necessarily as much 
prima facie evident as extreme starvation is, yet it is in potential equally disruptive for 
affected individuals’ life and the ‘proficient,’ resilient running of their societies. See also 
AMY R. BEAUDREAULT, NUTRITION POLICY PRIMER: THE UNTAPPED PATH TO GLOBAL 
HEALTH, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND HUMAN SECURITY 1, 3 (CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L 
STUD. 2019), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/ 
NutritionPrimer_layout_WEB_v5.pdf [https://perma.cc/W35R-G6JK].  For exhaustive 
data on hidden hunger, see Hannah Ritchie & Max Roser, Micronutrient Deficiency, OUR 
WORLD IN DATA (Aug. 2017), https://ourworldindata.org/micronutrient-deficiency 
[https://perma.cc/5C5N-E5S9]. 
 5 The reader is advised that certain academic publications on food insecurity are 
184 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLVI 
and Palestine. Part III will assess the soft law of R2P, with particular 
care to the different normative stances expressed by key global 
players. Part IV will expound the case-studies of Burundi and North 
Korea, enucleating the different approaches to the aforementioned 
rights and concepts in peacetime (North Korea) and wartime 
(Burundi).6  Part V will draw a comparison between Burundi and 
North Korea, supported by the theoretical grounds made explicit in 
the first sections.  Part VI will conclude, perhaps surprisingly, that 
not only is the R2P of negligible help in addressing RTF violations 
in wartime, but paradoxically, by spelling out more precise grounds 
for intervention, it politically (although not legally) resulted in a de 
facto restricting regime. On the contrary, R2P in peacetime can 
provide some useful legal bases to secure populations’ right to enjoy 
sufficient nutrition (not exclusively in quantitative terms).  It has 
been hypothesised that “[h]umanitarianism may have become an 
outlet for those looking for a place to express their politics in a place 
of purity, but it offers no such refuge[.]”7  This article seeks to 
demonstrate that with regards to human-induced or human-
worsened (hidden) hunger, this prophecy has already fulfilled itself. 
This analysis will rely primarily on process-narratives 
extrapolated from the selected case-studies, and secondarily rest on 
statistics, estimations, projections, and other empirical data 
retrieved from works by other Authors. This is to best cater8  for the 
 
unaware of the aforementioned technical, scientific meaning of ‘hidden hunger,’ so that 
they rather intend to examine generalised conditions of nutritional insecurity that escape 
metrics, surveys, and figures as reported in publicly released statistics. See, e.g., Madeleine 
‘Maddy’ Power et al., Hidden Hunger? Experiences of Food Insecurity Amongst Pakistani 
and White British Women, 120 BRIT. FOOD J., 2716, 2716-32 (2018). 
 6 Burundi and North Korea have been chosen not only for exemplifying wartime 
and peacetime conditions, but also for standing as the most food-insecure countries in 
Africa and Asia respectively, once one has omitted to consider ‘failed States’ such as 
Somalia. SARAD TANDON ET AL., , PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY 
41 (U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 2017),  https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/ 
84526/eib-175.pdf?v=7156 [https://perma.cc/6BSV-ASX8] (pursuing the same logic 
adopted by previous studies, and illustrating “different degrees of abuse of the right to food 
and different political and economic mechanisms that resulted in its abuse.”). RHODA E. 
HOWARD-HASSMANN, STATE FOOD CRIMES 4 (2016). 
 7 MICHAEL N. BARNETT, EMPIRE OF HUMANITY: A HISTORY OF HUMANITARIANISM 
237 (2011). 
 8 Deborah R. Hensler & Matthew Alexander Gasperetti, The Role of Empirical 
Legal Studies in Legal Scholarship, Legal Education and Policy Making: A US 
Perspective, in RETHINKING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: A TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE 450, 452 
(Rob Van Gestel, Hans W. Micklitz & Edward L. Rubin eds., 2017). 
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exigency to uncover what lies behind phenomena which have been 
described at length in social-science scholarship, but whose legal 
meaning and implications are yet to be assessed.   
II. Hidden Hunger: Towards a Qualitative ‘Right to Food’ for 
a Dignifying Life 
In public health, there is increasing evidence that social 
inequality, not just absolute deprivation, is bad for our health.  . . .  
Historically, human rights law has highlighted that poverty is not 
only about lack of money; it is also about discrimination and 
disempowerment.  . . .  Further, in a human rights framework, the 
ways in which certain people are low on the ladder represent not 
just a tragedy inherent vulnerability but active processes of 
exclusion and marginalization, for which there should 
accountability and redress.9 
The RTF, 10  which must “not be interpreted in a narrow or 
restrictive sense which equates it with a minimum package of 
calories,”11  is ordinarily understood as a negative right rather than 
a positive one. Indeed, the obligation that States owe their citizens 
is not necessarily to provide them with food directly for free 
(regardless of the circumstances), 12   but to avoid any undue 
interference with their access to sufficient amount of food13  for 
their survival and, in the understanding of some Authors, their 
overall wellbeing. This bounds the work of international 
organizations as well,14  not to mention the functioning of private 
 
 9 Alicia Ely Yamin, Shades of Dignity: Exploring the Demands of Equality in 
Applying Human Rights Frameworks to Health, 11 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 1, 2 (2009) 
(emphasis added). 
 10 See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 25 (Dec. 
10, 1948). 
 11 Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 12: The Right to 
Adequate Food, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5, ¶ 6 (May 12, 1999). 
 12 BANTEKAS & OETTE, supra note 2, at 349. 
 13 Especially in armed conflicts, “such scenarios can often be understood as 
violations of ESCR, particularly where [S]tates fail to respect rights, such as by directly 
interfering with the enjoyment of people’s access to housing, food, education or health, or 
where states fail to protect persons within their jurisdiction from abuses by non-state 
actors.”  See Schmid, supra note 3, at 524, 527 (emphasis added). 
 14 Fons Coomans, Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in the Framework of International Organisations, in 11 MAX PLANCK 
YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 360, 371–72 (Armin von Bogdandy, Rüdiger 
Wolfrum & Christiane E. Philipp eds., 2007). 
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companies within numerous domestic jurisdictions15  as much as 
transnationally.16  And yet, either by providing it directly or not 
hampering the access to it, a State’s duty to guarantee food 
availability is part of any security-based modern ‘social contract’ 
between governors and governed.17  Any Hobbesian-Rousseauian 
pact bestows a duty of policy coherence upon the governors, 
especially when resources are scarce or ill-distributed: that “a 
[S]tate … simultaneously commit[s] to a national hunger reduction 
strategy while participating in trading arrangements that leave their 
citizens virtually without recourse to corporations that commit 
rights abuses” is not acceptable. 18   Managing food security 
presupposes a careful balance between domestic consumption and 
stockpiling and international import/export of foodstuffs, which is 
why even the policies pursued by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) strive to ensure that States never choose to disregard food 
security for the only sake of trading more openly or efficiently.19  
The same holds true with regards to land-intensive foreign 
investments, that are to be sought only insofar as they do not prevent 
local citizens from feeding themselves by managing their own 
properties and—collectively—their State’s natural resources. 20  
 
 15 See Surabhi Chopra, The Rights to Food and Water: Dependencies and Dilemmas, 
INST. FOR HUM. RTS. & BUS. 27 (2010), https://www.ihrb.org/pdf/Right_to_Food_and_Wa 
ter_Dependencies_and_Dilemmas.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3FV-4X2L]. 
 16 See Jessica Fanzo et al., Tying the Knot: An Interdisciplinary Approach to 
Understanding the Human Right to Adequate Nutrition, 57 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L., 62, 
104–07 (2018). 
 17 Redie Bereketeab, State Legitimacy and Government Performance in the Horn of 
Africa, 79 AFR. STUD. 51, 58 (2020). 
 18 Nandini Ramanujam, Nicholas Caivano & Semahagn Gashu Abebe, From 
Justiciability to Justice: Realizing the Human Right to Food, 11 MCGILL INT’L J. 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 1, 16 (2015). 
 19 See generally Michael Fakhri, A History of Food Security and Agriculture in 
International Trade Law, 1945–2017, in NEW VOICES AND NEW PERSPECTIVES IN 
INTERNATINAL ECONOMICS LAW, 55 (John D. Haskell & Akbar Rasulov eds., 2019); 
Kerstin Mechlem, Harmonizing Trade in Agriculture and Human Rights: Options for the 
Integration of the Right to Food into the Agreement on Agriculture, in 10 MAX PLANCK 
YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 127 (Armin von Bogdandy & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 
2006). 
 20 See Christian Häberli & Fiona Smith, Food Security and Agri-Foreign Direct 
Investment in Weak States: Finding the Governance Gap to Avoid ‘Land Grab’, 77 MOD. 
L. REV. 189, 200 (2014); see also Carmen G. Gonzalez, World Poverty and Food 
Insecurity, 3 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 56, 80–2 (2015). 
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Relatively recently, 21   the focus also shifted from quantity to 
quality:22  not only does a population enjoy the right to access a 
sufficient ‘level’ of nutrition, but nourishment must also cover their 
basic physical needs.23  For instance, it must compute the access to 
essential micronutrients, the lack thereof leading to the so-defined 
‘hidden hunger,’ 24   severe diseases and, ultimately, to death. 25  
Children are particularly vulnerable to this phenomenon,26  which is 
detrimental to their physical and mental development and 
significantly shortens their life expectancy. 27  “What the United 
 
 21 Unfortunately, until one decade ago, it was still possible to denote the perpetuation 
of exceedingly parochial narratives such as that food quality in the developing world is not 
a concern because people there are hungry [sic], thus only quantity matters instead. See, 
e.g., HANS MORTEN HAUGEN, THE RIGHT TO FOOD AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: WITH A 
PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ MEASURES FOR FOOD PRODUCTION 
AND DISTRIBUTION 120-26 (2007).  “This emphasis on hunger also implies that the focus 
in this study will be on accessibility of food, which is the prevailing concern in developing 
countries.  Issues relating to food quality or acceptability, which is a stronger concern in 
many industrialized countries, will not receive much attention.  [ . . .  T]here is no doubt 
that, concerning food, the term ‘adequate’ must refer to a minimum daily food intake.  
Hunger exists as a consequence of food deprivation, or not having enough to eat.” Id. at 
120. 
 22 See Cecilia Rocha, Food Insecurity as Market Failure: A Contribution from 
Economics, 4 J. HUNGER & ENV’T NUTRITION 5, 7-8 (2007). 
 23 “The degree to which concern with micronutrient deficiencies became established 
within the development discourse could be seen, for instance, in the 2008 Copenhagen 
Consensus conference of leading international economists and specialists, who chose 
micronutrient remediation as one of the most cost-effective development interventions.” 
AYA HIRATA KIMURA, HIDDEN HUNGER: GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF SMARTER FOODS 2 
(2013). 
 24 “A chronic lack of micronutrients – vitamins and minerals – whose effects may 
not be immediately apparent and whose consequences may be long-term and profound.”  
Hans Konrad Biesalski, Hidden Hunger in the Developed World, in THE ROAD TO GOOD 
NUTRITION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 39, 40 (Manfred Eggersdorfer et al. eds., 2013); see 
also Destaw A. Yigzaw, Hunger and the Law: Freedom from Hunger as a Freestanding 
Right, 36 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 655, 660–61 (2014). 
 25 According to the United Nations, hidden hunger “increases vulnerability to 
infection, birth defects and impaired development and can lead to premature death.”  Hilal 
Elver (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food and Nutrition, U.N. Doc. A/71/282 (Aug. 3, 2016). 
 26 See generally Judith Hodge, Hidden Hunger: Approaches to Tackling 
Micronutrient Deficiencies, in NOURISHING MILLIONS: STORIES OF CHANGE IN NUTRITION 
35 (Stuart Gillespie et al. eds., 2016); Victor M. Aguayo, One in Three Children Do Not 
Get the Nutrition They Need, WORLD ECON. F. (Oct. 15, 2019), 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/10/one-in-three-children-dont-get-the-nutrition-
they-need/ [https://perma.cc/ED89-V6U4]. 
 27  “For instance, iron deficiency anaemia impacts negatively on cognitive 
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Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) calls ‘hidden hunger’ is 
undernourishment and/or malnutrition between birth and the age of 
five, and it has disastrous effects: a child  . . .  will never recover  . . .  
and will be disabled for life”. 28   Unsurprisingly, the relevant 
Convention specifies that the food provided must be “nutritious,”29  
echoed by the later Principles for Responsible Investment in 
Agriculture and Food Systems. 30   Scholars have plentifully 
demonstrated that as a consequence of the deregulated 
financialization of the real economy, 31  the resultant sharp price 
inflation of food commodities between 2006 and 2008, and 
governments’ inability to handle the crisis by ensuring essential 
levels and diversity of affordable food, 32   children in Central 
 
development and academic performance in school-age children  . . .  [v]itamin A 
deficiency is a leading cause of blindness and corneal damage. In developing countries, 
163 million children were estimated to be vitamin A-deficient.”  U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & 
SOC. AFF., WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SURVEY 2013: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
CHALLENGES, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/344, at 89-91, U.N. Sales No. E.13.II.C.1 (2013), 
available at  https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_current/ 
wess2013/WESS2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4FB-MET4].  Another example—an 
exceedingly severe one—comes from the noma disease.  See ‘The Tragedy of Noma’, 
prepared by Mr. Jean Ziegler, member of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, 
A/HRC/AC/3/CRP.3, 31 July 2009, ¶¶ 5, 9, 12, 41; Human Rights Council, Preliminary 
Study on Severe Malnutrition and Childhood Diseases with Children Affected by Noma 
as an Example, A/HRC/AC/7/CRP.2, ¶ 37 (Aug. 2, 2011); Human Rights Council, Study 
of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee on severe malnutrition and childhood 
diseases with children affected by noma as an example, A/HRC/AC/8/7, ¶¶ 8-9 (Jan. 23, 
2012). 
 28 Jean Ziegler (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Preliminary Report of the 
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Right to Food, ¶ 6, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/210 (July 23, 2001). 
 29 G.A. Res. 44/25, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 24.2(c) 
(Sept. 2, 1990). 
 30 Principles 1(i), 1(iv) and 8(vi); all of these ten Principles, which are obviously soft 
law, were endorsed by the Committee on World Food Security on October 15, 2014.  
COMM. ON WORLD FOOD SEC., PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT IN FOOD AND 
AGRICULTURE  (2014), http://www.fao.org/3/a-au866e.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9QM-
N6XG]. 
 31 See generally Anna E. Chadwick, Gambling on Hunger? The Right to Adequate 
Food and Commodity Derivatives Trading, 18 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233 (2018). 
 32 “There are three basic approaches to coping with the impact of high food prices 
once they hit world markets: domestic price stabilisation, increasing supplies available in 
local markets, and providing safety nets to poor consumers. All three are directed at and 
must be managed by individual countries themselves.”  Charles Peter Timmer, Food 
Security in Asia and the Pacific: The Rapidly Changing Role of Rice, 1 ASIA & PAC. POL’Y 
STUD. 73, 85-86 (2014). 
2021 HIDDEN HUNGER IN PEACETIME AND WARTIME 189 
African Republic, Ethiopia, Liberia and Sierra Leone have suffered 
long-term physical harm provoked by scarce dietary diversity and 
restricted intake of essential nutrients. 33   This is not surprising: 
“sharp increases in food prices can have as great an impact on 
hunger and mortality as crop failures  . . .  [A S]tate that lets this 
happen has failed to live up to its obligation to protect [its most 
vulnerable citizens’] right to food from the actions of other 
enterprises and individuals.”34 
Notably, the irresponsible, unaccountable,35  and inhumane (as 
well as unlawful) 36  Israeli segregation of Palestinians and 
expropriation or confiscation of their private property in the Gaza 
 
 33 Anna E. Chadwick, Commodity Derivatives, Contract Law, and Food Security, 9 
TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 371, 372 (2018).  Instead, it is not fully demonstrated that 
increased prices have resulted in riots and eventually led to the Arab Spring; regrettably, 
academic literature is often miscited to that effect by other scholars who cite previous 
works superficially.  See Lander & Vetharaniam reporting that “the violence that stemmed 
from the Arab Spring also took place in the context of rapid surges in the cost of basic 
commodities, including food,” despite the fact that its supporting source 
(Van Weezel) endeavoured to question exactly the pertinence of such link, as “to add some 
nuances to the current consensus in the literature, that higher food prices are 
strongly associated with civil unrest.”  Brian Lander & Rebecca Vetharaniam 
Richards, Addressing Hunger and Starvation in Situations of Armed Conflict - Laying the 
Foundations for Peace, 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 675, 686-87; see also Stijn 
van Weezel, Food Imports, International Prices, and Violence in Africa, 68 OXFORD 
ECON. PAPERS 758, 760 (2016).  For a sample of literature linking this inflation to the riots, 
see contra Matias E. Margulis, The World Trade Organization Between Law and Politics: 
Negotiating a Solution for Public Stockholding for Food Security 
Purposes, 9 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 343, 351 n.33 (2018). 
 34 FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., THE RIGHT TO FOOD GUIDELINES: INFORMATION PAPERS AND 
CASE STUDIES, 11 (2006), http://www.fao.org/3/a-a0511e.pdf [https://perma.cc/CK9B-
B8J8]. 
 35 But this will hopefully turn for the better soon.  See Jeff D. Handmaker & Alaa 
Tartir, ICC and Palestine Symposium: The (Non) Effects of Oslo on Rights and Status, 
OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 6, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/02/06/icc-and-palestine-
symposium-the-non-effects-of-oslo-on-rights-and-status/ [https://perma.cc/G2MT-
ZPLN]. 
 36 See Gilles Giacca & Ellen Nohle, Positive Obligations of the Occupying Power: 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 491, 515 (2019);  see also Winston P. Nagan & Aitza M. Haddad, The Legal and 
Policy Implications of the Possibility of Palestinian Statehood, U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 343, 379, 399, 433 (2012).  Contra Barak Medina, The Role of the Legislature in 
Determining Legitimate Responses to Security Threats: The Case of Israel, in ISRAELI 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING 445, 447 (Aharon Barak et al. eds, 2013). 
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Strip,37  where IHRL continues to apply38  and the complexity on 
the ground recursively revives discussions on a brand-new ius post 
bellum to be codified,39  has deprived entire generations of children 
of a balanced diet, 40   leading to hidden hunger 41   and related 
physical and mental deficiencies. 42   “The idea is to put the 
Palestinians on a diet, but not to make them die of hunger,” the 
businessman and legal advisor to Israel’s Ministry of Defense, Dov 
Weissglas, shamelessly remarked;43  this will cut fertility rates and 
 
 37 Shelly Aviv Yeini, The Law Enforcement Paradigm Under the Laws of Armed 
Conflict: Conceptualizing Yesh Din v. IDF Chief of Staff, 10 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 461, 
464-65;  see also HOWARD-HASSMANN, supra note 6, at 149. 
 38 See KATE PARLETT, THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 193 (2011). 
 39 Roxana Vatanparast, Waging Peace: Ambiguities, Contradictions, and Problems 
of a Jus Post Bellum Legal Framework, in JUS POST BELLUM: MAPPING THE NORMATIVE 
FOUNDATIONS 142, 148 (Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday & Jens Iverson eds., 2014). 
 40 See Jean Ziegler (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Report Submitted by 
the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/54 (Jan. 10, 
2003). 
 41 “Around 80% of Gazans are dependent on humanitarian aid, mainly food items. 
Since the blockade, abject poverty has tripled, necessitating a shift in diet from protein-
rich to low-cost, high-carbohydrate foods. This shift in diet has triggered concern about 
the incidence of vitamin and mineral deficiencies.”  SEADA HUSSEIN ADEM, PALESTINE 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 30 n.144 (2019). 
 42 In the Occupied Territories, “the Palestinians are suffering in the main from 
micronutrient deficiencies – what the World Health Organisation calls the ‘hidden hunger.’  
It may be less dramatic than the protein-energy malnutrition  . . .  but, on the scale that it 
is found among the Palestinians, it is just as serious.  Micronutrient deficient children fail 
to grow and develop normally; their cognition is damaged, often severely and irreversibly; 
and their immune systems are compromised.  In both adults and children, mental and 
physical capacities are impaired.  In extreme cases blindness and death result.”  Peter 
Hansen, Hungry in Gaza, GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2003), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/05/israel.guardiananalysispage 
[https://perma.cc/M5VD-PUZP]. Scholarly publications have confirmed that a “long 
history of dispossession and episodes of lower and higher intensity violence” (including 
unlawful food-deprivation due to spatial surveillance and psychological subjugation, as 
illustrated in the present analysis) has indeed jeopardized children’s mental health in 
Palestine; and yet, “[r]ather than considering social suffering an illness that needs to be 
‘cured’ it is the issue of collective and cumulative exposure to Israeli aggression and the 
international communities condoning of it, that needs to be addressed”.  Yoke Rabaia, 
Mahasin F. Saleh & Rita Giacaman, Sick or Sad? Supporting Palestinian Children Living 
in Conditions of Chronic Political Violence, 28 CHILD. & SOC’Y 172, 174, 178 (2014). 
 43 EVE SPANGLER, UNDERSTANDING ISRAEL/PALESTINE: RACE, NATION, AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN THE CONFLICT 187 (2015).  Similar threshold-centred narratives have been 
shaping the Israeli handling of Palestinians’ water-consumption needs.  See, e.g., Mia 
Tamarin, The Human(ised) Right to Water and Its Limits: The Case of Israel-Palestine, 6 
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the redundancy of “masses of economically superfluous young 
men,” then-Harvard ‘scholar’ Martin Seth Kramer proudly added.44  
Whatever the reasons, the geopolitical interests at play, and 
corollary excuses, there can be no doubts about Israel’s 
responsibilities: 
[I]n 1996, 10.6 percent of children under five were stunted, or too 
short for their age: in 2002 this figure had increased to 16.1 
percent, but it decreased to 11.8 percent in 2007. The 2002 figure 
is two years after the beginning of the second intifada, when Israel 
was particularly exigent in controlling borders. Similarly, the 
percentage of children under five who were wasted, or 
underweight, increased from 3.6 in 1996 to 9.4 in 2002, but 
declined to 1.8 in 2007. A 2007 study of the village of Beit Haroun 
in Gaza found that more than half the population went without 
fruit, vegetables, fish, and meat on most days.45 
And again, “the publicly released maps for the Gaza Strip … 
show that 178 km2 of the 358 km2 within the borders is under 
cultivation. Using multi-spectral satellite imagery, one can see that 
it is actually less than 100 km2. Much of this was subsequently 
compromised during the 2018–19 Great Return March 
demonstrations,”46  where 189 Palestinian faltalties were certified 
by an independent UN investigation and condemned as excessive 
and unjustified use of lethal force, while no fatalty was registered 
on the conflict-escalating Israeli side.47 
Gaza has been living for decades under a Kafkian, 
 
INT’L J. WATER GOV. 135, 141-2 (2018). 
 44 M.J. Rosenberg, Is Harvard Prof Advocating Palestinian Genocide?, HUFFPOST 
(Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/harvard-prof-urges-popula_b_472191 
[https://perma.cc/9V8G-CRM5]. Tellingly, Dr. Kramer is an influential and politically 
active Israeli citizen. Stephen Martin Walt, Kramer Versus Kramer, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 
28, 2010), https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/02/28/kramer-versus-kramer/ [https://perma.cc/ 
8S79-FN8V]; MAX BLUMENTHAL, GOLIATH: LIFE AND LOATHING IN GREATER ISRAEL 91 
(2013); see also Patrick Williams, Postcolonialism and Orientalism, in POSTCOLONIALISM 
AND ISLAM: THEORY, LITERATURE, CULTURE, SOCIETY AND FILM 48, 52 (Geoffrey Nash et 
al. eds., 2013) (providing academic commentary on Dr. Kramer’s controversial statement). 
 45 HOWARD-HASSMANN, supra note 6, at 118. 
 46 Alexander H. Hay et al., Reconstructing Infrastructure for Resilient Essential 
Services During and Following Protracted Conflict: A Conceptual Framework, 101 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 1001, 1017 (2019). 
 47 See Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission 
of Inquiry on the Protests in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, A/HRC/40/74, ¶¶ 90, 93 
(Feb. 25, 2019). 
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dispossessive, permanent state of exception where not only 
“individual military officials [sic] can determine what foods will be 
available to families  . . .  and make judgments about the quality of 
care that a child might expect from a relative in Gaza versus a parent 
in the West Bank,”48  but such a judgement is a quantitative-only 
assessment based on abstract governmental calculations over 
supposedly survival-ensuring caloric needs. 49   This is glaringly 
incorrect: 
nutrient requirements are individually determined and depend on, 
among other things, the sex and age of each individual. It is 
therefore difficult to generalize consumption and nutrition data 
across populations and the data cannot simply be aggregated at 
household or national levels as has been done with dietary energy 
intake in the past [ . . . ]. Such simplification ignores dietary 
quality. In the past, energy intake was simply used against 
referenced standards and thresholds established against standard 
deviations above or below the norm. Moreover, energy intake is 
only one requirement for sound nutrition. [ . . . ] Our expanded 
knowledge of the link between short-term shocks and long-term 
development has aroused widespread interest in how people build 
resilience to adversity.50 
Critically, “[w]hile calorie adequacy may ensure protein adequacy 
(though not protein quality), it most often fails to quench the hidden 
hunger”.51 
Israeli legislators routinely frame any domestic and 
 
 48 Sari Bashi, Controlling Perimeters, Controlling Lives: Israel and Gaza, 7 LAW & 
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 243, 263 (2013). 
 49 Id. at 259 n. 42.  Calculating dietary needs in such a robotised manner comes as 
an alienating distortion of the bureaucratic ‘culture of auditing’ that increasingly features 
in human-rights governmentality.  On this culture of ‘micromanagement’ and its too often 
concealed mishandling.  See, e.g., David McGrogan, The Population and the Individual: 
The Human Rights Audit as the Governmentalization of Global Human Rights 
Governance, 16 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1073, 1097 (2018) (“One of the dangers posed by 
human rights auditing is that it will come to constitute human rights work practiced as of 
right on subject populations, who in essence become managed—measured, monitored, and 
assessed—using exactly the same sort of processes that typically result in expressions of 
power that deny individuals their rights. The “techniques of rule,” that is, are not shifted 
by the development of human rights auditing. They are in fact reinforced.”). 
 50 Sheryl L. Hendriks, The Food Security Continuum: A Novel Tool for 
Understanding Food Insecurity as a Range of Experiences, 7 FOOD SEC. 609, 611 (2015). 
 51 Mahtab Sohrab Bamji et al., Nutritionally Sensitive Agriculture—An Approach to 
Reducing Hidden Hunger, EUR. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1, 2 (2020). 
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international policy in military-security lexicon, with any ensuing 
impact being left to second-class consideration.52  For example, they 
have turned a blind eye on the fact that the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)53  applies if 
not to Gaza, which is isolated but not directly controlled by Israel, 
at least to the occupied territories of the West Bank,54  as reaffirmed 
by the International Court of Justice.55  There, Palestinians are not 
starved by employing the most traditional (and overtly condemned) 
warfare methods, but brought to the most extreme edge of starvation 
by means of induced water shortage,56  trade restrictions, punitive 
waiting times, physical barriers, checkpoints, missing judicial 
review, income waste, destruction of cultivated soil by the settlers,57  
and surveillance techniques impairing their capability to feed 
themselves adequately. Indeed, ‘capability’ is defined as “an 
individual’s potential for performance of actions or achievement of 
desired outcomes through the intentional exercise of deliberate and 
autonomous activity,” 58   and it is a context-sensitive parameter 
 
 52 See The Traditional Security Concept, 40 ADELPHI PAPERS 9, 13 (2000)  
 53 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 54 See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding 
Observations: Israel, ¶¶ 15, 31, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.90 (May 23, 2003). 
 55 See Diana Kearney, Food Deprivations as Crimes Against Humanity, 46 N.Y.U. 
J. INT’L L. & POLS. 253, 277–78 (2013). 
 56 See Bruce Mitchell, Innovations and Challenges Related to Resource and 
Environmental Management, in SPATIAL DIVERSITY AND DYNAMICS IN RESOURCES AND 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT 113, 122 (Ashok K. Dutt et al. eds., 2015). In this piece, water 
shortage is not mentioned as an independent phenomenon, but rather, for its direct bearing 
on the affliction of micronutrients deficiency, when coupled with the trade, movement and 
market restrictions unlawfully imposed by the Israeli on the Palestinians. 
The negative consequences of water shortages for food production and other 
economic activities, and the possibility that such shortages could lead to regional 
conflict or wars, were the triggers for the concept of ‘virtual water.’  Virtual water 
was conceived . . . to allow water-scarce countries to reduce problems by 
importing food requiring significant water inputs.  By adopting a virtual water 
strategy, and importing the foodstuffs requiring high amounts of water input, 
governments in water-stressed or water-deprived countries could meet food 
security needs despite a limited water endowment. (emphasis added). 
Id. 
 57 See Tariq Dana, Localising the Economy as a Resistance Response: A 
Contribution to the “Resistance Economy” Debate in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, 15 J. PEACEBUILDING & DEV. 192, 199 (2020). 
 58 Paul B. Thompson, From World Hunger to Food Sovereignty: Food Ethics and 
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whose intercourse with resources varies constantly, depending on 
daily activities, phase of living, weather conditions, and countless 
more variables. 59   Notwithstanding this, it is in Gaza that the 
repercussions of Israeli policies are felt more dramatically.  Israel’s 
heavily-criticized economic siege inflicts “scarcity, pain, and 
humiliation on the civilian population,” 60   and contravenes the 
customary principle that (naval) blockades cannot be implemented 
to prevent foodstuffs from reaching civilians. 61  Its enforcement 
through law as legalised biopolitics aligns with a trend of blockades 
as liberal constructions of meta-warfare in West-derived 
modernity. 62   “Is Gaza an experimental lab for the production, 
maintenance, and profitability of biopolitical debilitation?” 63  
Deplorably, this sounds like a rhetorical question. 
In Palestine and beyond, hidden hunger is thus a crucial threat 
to the growth of individuals and the development of society,64  with 
appreciable impact on countries’ GDP; 65   even where absolute 
poverty fades, hidden hunger still soars.66  Disability-Adjusted Life 
Years (“DALYs”) metrics have been designed by social scientists 
 
Human Development, 11 J. GLOB. ETHICS 336, 336 (2015) (emphasis added). 
 59 See JENNIFER PRAH RUGER, HEALTH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 59 (2009). 
 60 ORNA BEN-NAFTALI ET AL., THE ABC OF THE OPT: A LEGAL LEXICON OF THE 
ISRAELI CONTROL OVER THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY 350 (2018). For a recount 
of similar — but not as extreme — dynamics at play in the occupied West Bank, see Aeyal 
Gross, Litigating the Right to Health Under Occupation: Between Bureaucracy and 
Humanitarianism, 27 MINN. J. INT’L L. 421, 443–48 (2018). 
 61 See Martin David Fink, Contemporary Views on the Lawfulness of Naval 
Blockades, 1 AEGEAN REV. L. SEA & MARITIME L. 191, 200–01 (2011). 
 62 See Nicholas J. T. Mulder & Boyd van Dijk, Why Did Starvation Not Become the 
Paradigmatic War Crime in International Law?, in SITUATING CONTINGENCY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIFFERENT LAW (Kevin Jon Heller & Ingo 




 63 Jasbir K. Puar, The ‘Right’ to Maim: Disablement and Inhumanist Biopolitics in 
Palestine, 14 BORDERLANDS 1, 17 (2015). 
 64 See Robin M. Houston, Hidden Hunger: A Global Challenge Facing Our 
Interdependent World, 5 J. WILDERNESS MED. 146, 149–50 (1994). 
 65 See U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, supra note 27, at 88–91; see also 
Alexander J. Stein and Matin Qaim, The Human and Economic Cost of Hidden Hunger, 
28 FOOD & NUTRITION BULL. 125, 131 (2007). 
 66 See SUSTAINABILITY CHALLENGES IN THE AGROFOOD SECTOR 12 (Rajeev Bhat ed., 
2017). 
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and nutritionists to evidence that whilst quantitative forms of hunger 
have fallen drastically in recent decades because of general 
improvements in life conditions, hidden hunger is still widespread 
due to inequal resource distribution, and it decreases globally at a 
disturbingly lower rate. 67   To exemplify, in South-East Asia, 
“despite recent progress  . . .  in terms of economic growth, 
agricultural output and exports, poverty reduction and even some 
indicators of improved child nutrition, the region’s burden of 
micronutrient deficiencies has improved little for several 
decades”.68  Hidden hunger is by no means confined to the Global 
South, 69   yet it hits harder when combined with subjugation, 
governmental unsuitability and space-control policies which call 
into question international law ‘templates.’ Despite this, exiguous 
attention has been dedicated thereto at the U.N. level,70  as well as 
 
 67 See Theda Gödecke et al., The Global Burden of Chronic and Hidden Hunger: 
Trends and Determinants, 17 GLOB. FOOD SEC. 21, 26–28 (2018); see also Julie C. Ruel-
Bergeron et al., Global Update and Trends of Hidden Hunger, 1995-2011: The Hidden 
Hunger Index, 10 PLOS ONE 1, 6 (2015); Tyler J. Titcomb & Sherry A. Tanumihardjo, 
Global Concerns with B Vitamin Statuses: Biofortification, Fortification, Hidden Hunger, 
Interactions, and Toxicity, 18 COMPREHENSIVE REV. IN FOOD SCI. & FOOD SAFETY 1968, 
1968–69 (2019). 
 68 Kassandra L. Harding et al., Hidden Hunger in South Asia: A Review of Recent 
Trends and Persistent Challenges, 21 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 785, 785 (2018). 
 69 See SUSTAINING GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY: THE NEXUS OF SCIENCE AND POLICY 499 
(Robert Zeigler ed., 2019). According to the United Nations, “[t]his is part of the global 
‘nutrition transition’, which is seeing a rise in consumption of energy-dense yet nutrient-
poor foods.” U.N. Secretary-General, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food, ¶ I(A)(9), U.N. Doc. A/71/282 (Aug. 3, 2016). 
 70 See U.N. International Human Rights Instruments, Report on Indicators for 
Monitoring Compliance with International Human Rights Instruments, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/MC/2006/7 (May 11, 2006) (stressing quantitative data – like the “minimum level of 
dietary energy consumption” – whilst making no mention of qualitative issues other than 
for food not to be poisoned or adulterated). Destaw A. Yigzaw, Hunger and the Law: 
Rethinking the Right to Food, 8 n.31, 9 n.34 (2011), available at  https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1962391 [https://perma.cc/GQM6-Y9TB]. Therefore, the 
problem lies with what performance indicators focus on, and not with how they present 
their findings (quantitatively, i.e., with numbers and indices, or qualitatively, i.e., 
narratively). Quantitative international indexes are acceptable or even preferable, insofar 
as they quantify both the calory-intake (i.e., ‘quantity’) and nutrient-variety (i.e., ‘quality’) 
of food.  For another example of shortsightedly quantitative indicator, i.e., the one chosen 
for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report 
(HDR), see Alexandra Homolar, Human Security Benchmarks: Governing Human 
Wellbeing at a Distance, 41 REV. INT’L STUD. 843, 849–50 (2015).  Regrettably, while this 
indicator is tentatively framed in human-security terms, it fails to acknowledge and address 
the full spectrum of hunger phenomena as outlined in the present analysis. Id, 
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multilaterally more generally; 71   the U.N. Security Council 
(“UNSC”) recently turned to famine as a security rather than 
developmental matter,72  but they did not bring hidden hunger to the 
table. Virtually no engagement with this concept has been paid by 
legal academics, either. Whilst there are dozens of books that at 
least tangentially explore the multidimensionality of hidden hunger 
from the perspectives of medicine, economics, criminology, 
political science, sociology, international relations, biotechnology, 
development studies, urban planning, demography, and so forth,73  
the legal implications of this phenomenon to date are carefully 
overlooked by most international publicists. In addressing hunger as 
a full-spectrum dimension of human security, lawyers should then 
embed themselves in critical attitudes producing “situated 
knowledge  . . .  rather than representing a detached striving for a 
virtuosic solo.”74  Only one single (although seminal) study has 
 
 71 Resoundingly, the negotiations towards the 2012 Food Aid Convention focused 
on donors’ obligations with respect to minimal monetary value or quantity-weight of food 
supply, rather than concurrently setting obligations related to such food’s actual nutritional 
provision; the Convention takes a holistic approach in that it does refer to adequacy of 
food provision, yet it remains vague on the operationalisation of said approach. See 
Annamaria La Chimia, Food Security and the Right to Food: Finding Balance in the 2012 
Food Assistance Convention, 65 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 99, 115–20 (2016).  Therefore, there 
would be no surprise if in a survey on World Food Program’s aid delivery, “quality issues 
emerged as the most important limitation, raised in nearly all operations visited for [the] 
evaluation. These included delayed or incomplete distributions, inappropriate types of 
food, lack of food diversity and low-quality, expired or rotten food. Many interviewees 
linked these problems to WFP’s perceived prioritizing of quantity over quality.” See 
STEETS ET AL., EVALUATION OF WFP POLICIES ON HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES AND ACCESS 
IN HUMANITARIAN CONTEXTS 7 (U.N. WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME 2018), 
https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000072044/download/ 
[https://perma.cc/TU3N-FZNP]. 
 72 See Salvatore Zappalà, Conflict Related Hunger, ‘Starvation Crimes’ and UN 
Security Council Resolution 2417 (2018), 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 881, 886 (2019). 
 73 See generally Simone Hutter, Starvation in Armed Conflicts: An Analysis Based 
on the Right to Food, 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 723 (2019); ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE & ESTHER 
DUFLO, POOR ECONOMICS: A RADICAL RETHINKING OF THE WAY TO FIGHT GLOBAL 
POVERTY (2012); BRUCE CURRIE-ALDER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: IDEAS, 
EXPERIENCE, AND PROSPECTS (1st ed. 2014); JOHN COGGON & SWATI GOLA, GLOBAL 
HEALTH AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: ETHICAL, POLITICAL AND REGULATORY 
CHALLENGES (2013); HIDDEN HUNGER: STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE NUTRITION QUALITY 
(Hans Konrad Biesalski & Regina Birner eds., 2018).  See, e.g., Richard David Semba, 
The Rise and Fall of Protein Malnutrition in Global Health, 69 ANNALS OF NUTRITION & 
METABOLISM 79, 79–88 (2016). 
 74 Jonathan Luke Austin et al., Doing and Mediating Critique: An Invitation to 
Practice Companionship, 50 SEC. DIALOGUE 3, 7 (2019). 
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been conducted on the matter through the lenses of IHL or IHRL, 
remedying the lacuna that facing food security “crises often attract 
more attention than do widespread and persistent vulnerabilities.”75  
The study concerns the Gaza puzzle introduced supra, with an 
implicit accent on the engineering of ‘pretended humanitarianism’ 
as spectacle: 
Food-power mechanisms [can be] used to manipulate food 
transfers as a means of warfare, punishment, and humiliation of 
civilian populations  . . .  [F]or a population “on the verge of 
humanitarian disaster,”  . . .  the part is not played because their 
harms are not visible, and the spectators, be they the courts of law 
or the courts of public opinion, are not as alert to the harm as they 
would be if those who suffered “looked” their part. Thus, the 
deliberation of whether or not “hunger” exists in Gaza that was 
conducted, for example, by the Turkel Commission missed the 
“hidden hunger”  . . .  . The accepted international law 
understanding of the right to food  . . .  rejects the “minimum 
standard” approach manifested in the Israeli Red Lines Document 
and inherent to the Turkel Commission’s position on the matter, 
namely that Israel has met its duty towards the population in Gaza 
if conditions of starvation have not arisen.76 
The RTF also stands as a precondition for achieving the 
fulfilment of the right to health: 77   besides the most visible 
manifestations of malnutrition per se, poor diet is an underlying 
factor in noncommunicable diseases,78  particularly for those whose 
immune system was weakened because of the hunger-disease spiral 
 
 75 AEYAL GROSS, THE WRITING ON THE WALL: RETHINKING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
OF OCCUPATION 242 (2017). 
 76 Aeyal Gross & Tamar Feldman, “We Didn’t Want to Hear the Word ‘Calories’”: 
Rethinking Food Security, Food Power, and Food Sovereignty—Lessons from the Gaza 
Closure, 33 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 379, 383 (2015).  One relevant highlight is that “contrary 
to popular perception, even those who appear overfed might actually be suffering from 
hidden hunger.” Yigzaw, supra note 24, at 661 n.24.  
 77 See, e.g., Athanasia ‘Sia’ Spiliopoulou Åkermark, Human Rights, Globalisation, 
Trade and Development, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 
373, 380 (Catarina Krause et al. eds., 2012); Brigit C. A. Toebes, International Health 
Law: An Emerging Field of Public International Law, 55 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 299, 308–18 
(2015). 
 78 See Emilie K. Aguirre, The Importance of the Right to Food for Achieving Global 
Health, 9 GLOB. HEALTH GOVERNANCE 164, 167 (2015); Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 25 (2020) on Science and Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (arts. 15 (1) (b), (2), (3) & (4) of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/GC/25, ¶ 66 (Apr. 30, 2020). 
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effect.79  It is equally accepted, more generally, that human rights 
are interrelated and interdependent; 80   this is a principle 
underpinning one of the main lines of reasoning employed to 
counter the argument that economic, social, and cultural rights 
represent policy benchmarks more than provisions creating 
obligations (contrary to civil and political ones).81  If that was the 
case, the RTF, for example, would be considered too costly82  and 
idealistic for accomplishing its progressive realisation and full 
justiciability. 83   Instead, States enjoy a certain margin of 
appreciation about the specific conduct to adopt as to attain socio-
economic rights,84  but not necessarily about its timing,85  so that 
they shall immediately fulfil their ‘minimum core’ duties: 86   “a 
progressively realized obligation to protect people’s resource base 
 
 79 See Ana Ayala & Benjamin Mason Meier, A Human Rights Approach to the 
Health Implications of Food and Nutrition Insecurity, 38 PUB. HEALTH REV. 1, 3 (2017). 
 80 See Gillian MacNaughton & Mariah McGill, The Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights: Mapping the Evolution of the Right to Health, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL HEALTH: RIGHTS-BASED GOVERNANCE FOR A GLOBALIZING 
WORLD 463, 476–77 (Benjamin Mason Meier & Lawrence Oglethorpe Gostin eds., 2018); 
see also HOWARD-HASSMANN, supra note 6, at 180–96. 
 81 Eibe H. Riedel, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK, supra note 77, at 136 (Catarina Krause et 
al. eds., 2012); cf. Schmid, supra note 3, at 526 n.7. 
 82 Riedel, supra note 81, at 138. 
 83 Id. at 139. 
 84 See Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in 
International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 917 (2005). 
 85 See also Katharine G. Young, Waiting for Rights: Progressive Realization and 
Lost Time, in THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 654, 665–78 (Katharine G. 
Young ed., 2019). 
 86 See Pierre Thielbörger, The “Essence” of International Human Rights, 20 GER. L. 
J. 924, 935 (2019).  Elaborating on this, the idea we propound entails a radical paradigm-
reversal as far as timing is concerned: from our perspective, ‘minimum core’ is not 
identified with acute hunger, followed by progressive improvements in chronic (hidden) 
hunger; contrariwise, it concerns a minimum nutritional attainment which should trigger 
neither state of hunger at any single point in time, that is, from the very outset as well.  
Phrased differently: for us, fighting hidden hunger is not the second and secondary phase 
of the progressive obligation that comes after acute hunger has been completely eradicated 
(which will likely never happen), but rather, it is a necessary component of the core of the 
obligation that needs to be satisfied up to an elementary standard from the very beginning.  
Indeed, in our view (as defended in what follows), hidden hunger is not less severe than 
the acute one, but just a qualitatively different, equally dangerous, and mostly 
simultaneous manifestation of complex interdependency between malnutrition, poverty, 
neglection, dispossession, and repression. 
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for food requires immediate steps to be taken, including the 
adoption of legislative measures.”87  On top of that, in legal and 
practical terms, it must be admitted that “[w]ithout the right to an 
adequate standard of living,  . . .  civil and political rights would  . . .  
be rendered meaningless.”88  In fact, neither the three landmark 
systems (1950 European Convention on Human Rights, 1969 
American Convention on Human Rights,89  1981 African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights) nor the 2004 Arab Charter on 
Human Rights contain stand-alone provisions about the RTF; 
further, the RTF is only mentioned in passing by the embryonic 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 90  (as 
well as by several domestic Constitutions and ordinary legislation 
around the planet91).  The interplay between the right to food and 
that to health is beneficial for addressing hidden hunger, as the right 
to health “embraces  . . .  conditions in which people can [live] a 
healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinants of health, 
such as food and nutrition.”92  Contrariwise, it must be noticed that, 
as strange as it sounds, the incorporation of the RTF into the one to 
life may jeopardise the justiciability of the causes of hidden hunger. 
This surfaces in regional human rights arrangements, where the 
denial of access to food can be heard before the relevant courts as a 
 
 87 Hutter, supra note 73, at 741. 
 88 Riedel, supra note 81, at 137. 
 89 Except for the 1998 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human 
Rights in the area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, also known as “Protocol of 
San Salvador,” art. 12, which is not directly enforceable.  See Oswaldo R. Ruiz-Chiriboga, 
The American Convention and the Protocol of San Salvador: Two Intertwined Treaties: 
Non-Enforceability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System, 
31 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 159, 173 (2013). 
 90 See ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Ass’n of Se. Asian Nations [ASEAN], 
art. 28 (Nov. 18, 2012). 
 91 See BANTEKAS & OETTE, supra note 2, at 441; see also , INT’L DEV. L. ORG.,  
REALIZING THE RIGHT TO FOOD: LEGAL STRATEGIES AND APPROACHES: EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 5 (2014), https://www.idlo.int/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/Realizing% 
20the%20Right%20to%20Food_Legal%20Strategies%20and%20Approaches_executive
-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5VK-G4YZ]; JACQUELINE HANOMAN, HUNGER AND 
POVERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE HIDDEN FACES OF FOOD INSECURITY 10, 26–27 (2018); 
Nadia C. S. Lambek & Priscilla Claeys, Institutionalizing a Fully Realized Right to Food: 
Progress, Limitations, and Lessons Learned from Emerging Alternative Policy Models, 40 
VT. L. REV. 743, 753–59 (2016) . 
 92 Isabella Rae, Women and the Right to Food: International Law and State Practice, 
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. 17–18 (2008), http://www.oda-alc.org/documentos/1352638973.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P58R-PNAP] (emphasis added). 
200 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLVI 
corollary of the violation of the right to life, but only when such 
denial amounts to ‘common’ starvation whose severity would lead 
to death in the short run,93  or when the “destruction of subsistence 
food supply”94  is at stake.  Recent developments may challenge this 
assumption, yet their implications are all to be demonstrated, given 
their possibly overambitious scope: the U.N. Human Rights 
Committee stipulated that the right to life is violated whenever 
citizens, regardless of their eventual death, are prevented from 
living with dignity, for example in conditions of hunger or 
malnutrition.95  The call for a dignified life (‘vida digna’), for a 
beyond-survival life potentially worth living, that somehow 
overcomes the blank-letter demarcations between rights, is 
increasingly formulated by the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights too (especially in the context of the protection of the 
living environment96), with mixed results.97  On another note, in 
 
 93 See Christian Courtis, The Right to Food as a Justiciable Right: Challenges and 
Strategies, in 11 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW, supra note 14, at 329 
(2007).  A tiny leeway is bestowed by the reconceptualization of the right to life as 
something more than the mere contrary of death, allowing for considerations revolving on 
the dignity of existence.  See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, General 
Comment No. 3: The Right to Life (Article 4), ¶ 36, (Nov. 18, 2015); Villagrán Morales et 
al. v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, ¶ 144 (Nov. 19, 
1999).  For a juridical-philosophical critique of ‘human dignity,’ see Philippe-André 
Rodriguez, Human Dignity as an Essentially Contested Concept, 28 CAMBRIDGE REV. 
INT’L AFF. 743, 751 (2015) (pontificating whether dignity belongs to the private sphere of 
any individual, or it is about a ‘core’ of entitlements which should be scrutinised and 
enforced by external forces whenever the subjects are unable or unwilling to do them 
justice. Moreover, is ‘human dignity’ also a collective entitlement, something superior that 
transcends the simple sum of all individuals’ rights and duties?). 
 94 Ekkehard Strauss, Monitoring and Fact Finding by UN Human Rights 
Mechanisms, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RALLYING TO THE R2P 
CAUSE? 79 (Mónica Serrano & Thomas G. Weiss eds., 2014). 
 95 See U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36: The Right to Life 
(Article 6), ¶ 26, CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018).  For another scholarly examination of 
this General Comment touching upon the right to food, see Mona Rishmawi, Protecting 
the Right to Life in Protracted Conflicts: The Existence and Dignity Dimensions of General 
Comment 36, 101 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 1149, 1162–67 (2019). 
 96 Interestingly, human rights to a “healthy environment” and the like can be traced 
in more than a hundred Constitutions around the globe.  See BURNS H. WESTON & DAVID 
BOLLIER, GREEN GOVERNANCE: ECOLOGICAL SURVIVAL, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE LAW OF 
THE COMMONS 320–28 (2013). 
 97 See Thomas M. Antkowiak, A “Dignified Life” and the Resurgence of Social 
Rights, 18 NW. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 24 (2020); see also ISAAC DE PAZ GONZÁLEZ, THE SOCIAL 
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE IN THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: SHADOW AND 
LIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 127 (2018); Louis J. Kotzé & Evadne Grant, 
2021 HIDDEN HUNGER IN PEACETIME AND WARTIME 201 
limited and ‘niche’ circumstances, the denial of access to food can 
also amount to inhuman and degrading treatment rather than a 
violation of the right to life; this occurs when to be at stake is the 
quality rather than the quantity of food. In Stanev, before the 
European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), the applicant “was 
forced to live in a psychiatric institution in unsanitary conditions 
and with insufficient and poor-quality food.” 98   The Grand 
Chamber declared to be considerably concerned99  at the scarce 
variety of nutrients intake allowed by the food-provision system 
under scrutiny.100  Less urgent, but still worthy of consideration, is 
the “cultural convenience of food and respect for the value-system 
of the habitual diet,”101  which might help furthering our dismissal 
for caloric-only understandings of food provision and consumption. 
Indeed, beyond-survival eating also stands as a symbolic ritual, 
which certain indigenous communities might even experience as a 
transformative act of sacredness in symbiosis with their lands.102 
Self-evidently, “the lack of access to food during armed 
conflicts exacts a heavy toll on human life and often results from 
 
Environmental Rights in the Global South, in RESOURCE HANDBOOK ON LAW, 
ENVIRONMENT AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 86, 107–08 (Philippe Cullet & Sujith Koonan eds., 
2019); Alexandra R. Harrington, Life as We Know It: The Expansion of the Right to Life 
Under the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 35 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 313, 337–38 (2013); Alexandra V. Huneeus, Human Rights 
Between Jurisprudence and Social Science, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 255, 262–63 (2015); 
Naiara Posenato, La giurisprudenza della Corte interamericana in materia di diritti alla 
vita e alla proprietà dei popoli indigeni e tribali [The jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court on the rights to life and property of indigenous and tribal peoples], DPCE ONLINE 
139, 154 (2018), http://www.dpceonline.it/index.php/dpceonline/article/view/489/472 
[https://perma.cc/6CZM-BHNU].  See generally Mary Beloff & Laura Clérico, Derecho a 
condiciones de existencia digna y situación de vulnerabilidad en la jurisprudencia de la 
Corte Interamericana [The Right to dignified living conditions and the situation of 
vulnerability in the decisions of the Inter-American Court], 14 ESTUDIOS 
CONSTITUCIONALES [CONST. STUD.] 139 (2016). 
 98 Ramanujam et al., supra note 18, at 10. 
 99 Stanev v. Bulgaria, 2012-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 81, 140. 
 100 See id. at 110. 
 101 Adriana Fillol Mazo, The Protection of Access to Food for Civilians under 
International Humanitarian Law: Acts Constituting War Crimes, 14 AGE HUM. RTS. J. 
181, 198 at 37 (2020). 
 102 Lindsey Carol Pointer, Justice Performed: The Normative, Transformative, and 
Proleptic Dimensions of the Restorative Justice Ritual 97–98 (2019) (unpublished PhD 
Thesis at Victoria University of Wellington), https://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/xmlui/ 
bitstream/handle/10063/8581/thesis_access.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/Y23W-
HUNH]. 
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adverse human agency.”103  This goes uncontested in conventional 
wars, 104   unfolding remarkable ties (or, at times, substantive 
overlap) between the state responsibility under IHRL and the 
individual responsibility under ICL.105  On the opposite side of the 
spectrum, low-intensity conflicts, whether national or international, 
are lengthy in nature as well as exhausting for the involved 
populations, and more controversially addressed by international 
law.106  Some of these conflicts are protracted for so long that they 
become a structural condition of said populations’ entire existence, 
spanning across multiple generations, up to transforming the 
‘anthropology’ of certain societal dynamics in the most severe 
scenarios. 107   As an anxiety-depleting mechanism that indirectly 
leads to protracting conflicts, humans tend to comfort themselves 
with convincements of decency-in-continuity that superficially 
defuse the call for revolutionary agency (and thus urgency) which 
would otherwise be naturally embedded in their perilous life 
conditions. 108   In those contexts, the gist of the problem is not 
necessarily a lack of food per se, as it generally is in conventional 
warfare, but rather the impossibility to access proper aliments.109  
 
 103 EVELYNE SCHMID, TAKING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 166 (2015). 
 104 See, e.g., FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., SOWING THE SEEDS OF PEACE FOR FOOD SECURITY: 
DISENTANGLING THE NEXUS BETWEEN CONFLICT, FOOD SECURITY, AND PEACE (Cindy 
Holleman et al. eds., 2017), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i7821e.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZA23-
T3SV]. 
 105 See Schmid, supra note 3, at 204. 
 106 See generally Dustin A. Lewis, The Notion of “Protracted Armed Conflict” in the 
Rome Statute and the Termination of Armed Conflicts Under International Law: An 
Analysis of Select Issues, 101 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 1091 (2019). 
 107 See, e.g., John P. Cann, Low-Intensity Conflict, Insurgency, Terrorism and 
Revolutionary War, in PALGRAVE ADVANCES IN MODERN MILITARY HISTORY 107, 117 
(Matthew Hughes & William James Philpott eds., 2006); Teddy Atim, Looking Beyond 
Conflict: The Long-Term Impact of Suffering War Crimes on Recovery in Post-Conflict 
Northern Uganda (2018) (Ph.D. dissertation, Wageningen University) (on file with the 
Wageningen University & Research Library); Maya Kahanoff, Collective Trauma, 
Recognition and Reconciliation in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, in RECOGNITION AS 
KEY FOR RECONCILIATION: ISRAEL, PALESTINE, AND BEYOND 59 (Yoram Meital & Paula 
M. Rayman eds., 2018); L. C. Green, Low-Intensity Conflict and the Law, 3 ILSA J. INT’L 
& COMPAR. L. 493, 493–521 (1997); PAUL EDWARD FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: 
HEALTH , HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE NEW WAR ON THE POOR 30–31 (2003). 
 108 See Felix Berenskötter, Anxiety, Time, and Agency, 12 INT’L THEORY 273, 284 
(2020). 
 109 See, e.g., Koen Vlassenroot, Salomé Ntububa & Timothy Raeymaekers, Food 
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Among other causes, hidden hunger manifests itself prominently 
when populations “are forced to survive on inadequate diets, eating 
almost the same thing every day,”110  which is a typical condition in 
countries under embargo or food rationing and cities under siege, or 
where most food sources are contaminated111 (e.g. as a spillover 
effect of conflicts, when factories are retrofitted for armament 
production and civilian infrastructure remains unattended).  The 
fourth Geneva Convention prohibits sanctions from interfering with 
the provision of food relief, but if those sanctions are enacted by the 
UNSC, the latter is not directly bound by IHL.112  As for States 
instead, do they retain the duty to ‘offset’ their internal 
consequences of a war backdrop with a more proactive engagement 
with human rights, for instance by providing balanced and healthy 
food (or proactively encouraging external actors, like NGOs and the 
deputed U.N. specialised agencies, to do so on their behalf, in terms 
of humanitarian assistance)?  The U.N. Committee on Social, 
Economic and Cultural Rights answered in the positive, as not only 
“States have a core obligation to take the necessary action to 
mitigate and alleviate hunger  . . .  even in times of natural or other 
disasters,”113  but more demandingly, “whenever an individual or 
group is unable, for reasons beyond their control, to enjoy the right 
to adequate food by the means at their disposal, States have the 
obligation to [fulfil] that right directly.” 114   ‘Adequacy’ is 
formulated in qualitative terms too: “[d]ietary needs implies that the 
diet as a whole contains a mix of nutrients for physical and mental 
growth, development and maintenance,” 115   that is, “sufficient 
macronutrients and micronutrients.”116 
 
Security Responses to the Protracted Crisis Context of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. 12 (Sept. 23, 2003), http://www.fao.org/3/a-ag307e.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/JA7D-AZHF] (stating that, in the DRC, “[t]he availability of financial 
assets [was] not sufficient to obtain high-quality food, which in turn [led] to shifts in food 
patterns to the advantage of cheap but less nutritious products”). 
 110 Yigzaw, supra note 24, at 661 n.24. 
 111 See Monica Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 341, 370 
n.189 (2010). 
 112 GARY WILSON, THE UNITED NATIONS AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY 89 (2014). 
 113 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 10, ¶ 6. 
 114 Id. ¶ 15 (emphasis added). 
 115 Id. ¶ 9 (emphasis omitted). 
 116 Susan Randolph & Shareen Hertel, The Right to Food: A Global Perspective, in 
THE STATE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HUMAN RIGHTS: A GLOBAL OVERVIEW 21, 25 (Lanse 
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A strikingly similar situation is replicated in peacetime, when 
dictatorial regimes exercise such a wearing control over the 
‘citizenry’ that the latter’s capability of accessing the necessary 
food resources is impaired; in this sense, lack of food acquires a 
significant legal standing, dissimilar to the one originating e.g. from 
living conditions induced by a protracted famine.  Hidden hunger, 
more specifically, becomes a deceitful means of collective 
subjugation.  Once this stage is reached, one might wonder if 
governments can be held accountable, that is to say, whether States’ 
crafting of situations causing hidden hunger represents a violation 
of States’ obligation not to interfere with citizens’ access to the right 
nutrients, and if so, to what extent.  “It is about shifting the burden 
of responsibility from the draught  . . .  to human beings . . . It is 
about challenging the international community’s tolerance of 
hunger.” 117   Out of the awareness that the discrepancy between 
quantity and quality we call ‘hidden hunger,’ as a widespread and 
globalised phenomenon of contemporary times, is not an 
unavoidable consequence of ‘raw-material’ shortage but rather 
often a by-product of transnational food governance dynamics of 
waste and profit whose legal roots have been aptly portrayed by 
scholars, 118   this piece will not examine corporate(-dependent) 
liabilities;119  instead, it is dedicated to purely State-driven causes 
which are culpably triggered or negligently tolerated. 
III. R2P: Novelty, Limits, and Potentialities 
The responsibility to protect applies, until Member States decide 
otherwise, only to the four specified crimes and violations: 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. To try to extend it to cover other calamities  . . .  would 
undermine the 2005 consensus and stretch the concept beyond 
recognition or operational utility.120 
 
Minkler ed., 2013). 
 117 Yigzaw, supra note 70, at 6–7. 
 118 See, e.g., Matthew C. Canfield, Compromised Collaborations: Food, Fuel, and 
Power in Transnational Food Security Governance, in 9 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 272, 
272–73 (2018); Tomaso Ferrando, Financialisation of the Transnational Food Chain: 
From Threat to Leverage Point?, in 9 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 316, 316 (2018). 
 119 On these liabilities, see generally Smita Narula, The Right to Food: Holding 
Global Actors Accountable Under International Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 691, 
711–71 (2006). 
 120 U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, ¶ 10(b), U.N. 
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There is little doubt that the U.N. Charter prioritises the 
principles of non-intervention 121   and of (formalistic) sovereign 
equality of States, 122   understood as a means to preserve their 
territorial integrity and political independence,123  over the instances 
of humanitarian protection: not only does it strictly regulate how to 
proceed in the event of international conflicts,124  but also, and more 
meaningfully, it remains silent on how to respond to occurrences of 
domestic conflict. In other words, the “Charter’s core commitment 
to national sovereignty seemed an insuperable obstacle to 
international intervention in conflicts that took place within the 
boundaries of a State.”125  This was restated in subsequent U.N. 
documents.126  Nevertheless, the most intriguing case of interaction 
between the RTF and military intervention before the adoption of 
the R2P framework is the one related to the oppression of the 
Kurdish minority in Iraq, following Iraq’s defeat in the (First) 
Persian Gulf War. 127   Since international humanitarian agencies 
were not permitted to enter the territory to protect civilians (whose 
lives were at risk, and who were starving), the United States’ 
“administration announced that it would commence dropping 
food  . . .  in partnership with France and the United Kingdom” and, 
“when it appeared as if the aid effort was being substantially 
compromised  . . .  President Bush announced unilaterally that U.S. 
troops would enter Northern Iraq.”128  All of this, notwithstanding 
the lack of international authorisation to intervene that way:129  it 
 
Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009).  See generally Auriane Botte, Redefining the Responsibility 
to Protect Concept as a Response to International Crimes, 19 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1029 
(2015) (discussing the relationship between these four international crimes and the R2P 
genesis and application). 
 121 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 122 See also Hans Köchler, The United Nations Organization and Global Power 
Politics: The Antagonism Between Power and Law and the Future of World Order, 5 
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 323, 327, 336 (2006). 
 123 See Spencer Zifcak, The Responsibility to Protect, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 484, 
486 (Malcolm David Evans ed., 2018). 
 124 U.N. Charter ch. VII. 
 125 Zifcak, supra note 123, at 484. 
 126 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2625, Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the UN (Oct. 24, 1970). 
 127 See Zifcak, supra note 123, at 488. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See S.C. Res. 688 (Apr. 5, 1991) (peremptorily condemning Iraq’s behaviour 
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was a calculated political choice, not a (sense of) legal obligation.130  
Along similar lines, although under a broadly phrased UNSC 
mandate, U.S. troops invaded Somalia two years later and, despite 
failing the mission of facilitating a peace process, they successfully 
relieved a quarter million lives from likely death by starvation.131 
In the aftermath of the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica, and 
by engaging in fierce debates over NATO’s intervention in 
Kosovo, 132  the attitude of the international community towards 
matters of ‘compelling’ humanitarian intervention started to 
change.133  A progressivist, globalist rhetoric of fraternal human 
agency in history ostensibly abdicated to perfect formal equality of 
sovereignties, with the aim of sponsoring a XXI-century re-edition 
of Arendt’s “‘right to have rights’  . . .  to enjoy human rights as 
civil rights protected by one’s own [S]tate.”134  The International 
 
against humanitarian agencies, yet not endorsing any foreign military intervention). 
 130 See James Mayall, Non-Intervention, Self-Determination and the New World 
Order, in POLITICAL THEORY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND THE ETHICS OF 
INTERVENTION, 167, 174–75 (Ian Forbes & Mark Hoffman eds., 1993). 
[I]t would be imprudent in practice, and wrong in theory, to generalise from the 
international obligations towards the Kurds in favour of an international 
enforcement mechanism for human rights, wherever they are abused. It would be 
imprudent because, however desirable such enforcement might be, the system 
would be unlikely to attract either the degree of public support, or the resources, 
to make it credible. It would be wrong in theory because the obligation towards 
the Kurds does not arise merely from a general principle of human solidarity. 
Id. at 174. 
 131 See Manfred Nowak et al., R2P and the Prohibition of Torture, in RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT (R2P): A NEW PARADIGM OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? 293, 298–99 (Peter 
Hilpold ed., 2015) see also MELISSA T. LABONTE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN 
NORMS, STRATEGIC FRAMING, AND INTERVENTION: LESSONS FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT 64–94 (2013). 
 132 See Dan Bulley, The Politics of Ethical Foreign Policy: A Responsibility to Protect 
Whom?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 441, 445–46 (2010). 
 133 See Judith Large & Timothy D. Sisk, Democracy, Conflict and Human Security: 
Pursuing Peace in the 21st Century, INT’L INST. DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE 
16 (2006), https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/democracy-conflict-and-
human-security-handbook-volume-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2MK-6Y9S];   see also 
Stephan Stetter, The Legal Foundations of Normative Borders and Normative Orders: 
Individual and Human Rights and the Israel-Palestine-EU Triangle, in FRAGMENTED 
BORDERS, INTERDEPENDENCE AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS: THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE-
EUROPEAN UNION TRIANGLE 155, 160 (Raffaella A. Del Sarto ed., 2015); ANNETTE 
JANSEN, ANTI-GENOCIDE ACTIVISTS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 195 (2017). 
 134 Ayça Çubukçu, Thinking Against Humanity, 5 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 251, 254 
(2017). 
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Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty emphasised, in 
its preparatory work leading to the 2005 Summit, the shifted focus 
in humanitarian intervention from traditional security to the new 
multi-layered paradigms of human security, 135   that is, “from 
territorial security, and security through armaments, to security 
through human development with access to food and employment” 
given that “the security of people against threats to life, health, 
livelihood, personal safety and human dignity  . . .  can be put at 
risk  . . .  by factors within a country, including ‘security’ forces.”136  
We cannot subscribe to the claim that human security necessarily 
“decentralizes security away from the State”;137  all the contrary: 
human security compels States to ensure their citizens are safe not 
simply because their physical integrity is preserved from deadly 
military attacks, but because they need not fear for a decent 
existence tomorrow.  This was a “distinctly African contribution to 
global human rights, with many African [S]tates possessing an 
historical tradition of reciprocal rights and obligations which bind 
sovereigns and subjects”, as retrievable from the African Union’s 
2000 Constitutive Act.138  The IHRL discourse tenaciously came 
into the picture,139  insofar as it represented the leverage to ‘creep 
into the cracks’ of sovereign territoriality140  and to uphold the moral 
supremacy of non-indifference.141  For example, the concepts of 
 
 135 See  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. [OECD], Concepts and Dilemmas 
of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, 9 OECD J. ON DEV. 
61, 69 (2009). 
 136 INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND ST. SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY 15 (2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HNW2-Z34K] (emphasis added). 
 137 Alise Coen, R2P, Global Governance, and the Syrian Refugee Crisis, 19 INT’L J. 
HUM. RTS. 1044, 1046 (2015). 
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note 2, at 655. 
 140 Zifcak, supra note 123, at 490–91. 
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Rsch., Working Paper No. 29, 2012), https://www.wti.org/media/filer_public/9b/ 
df/9bdf2080-37b0-460f-98bb-d63e418ad88a/responsibility_to_protect_and_common_co 
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‘starvation’ (illegal policy involving prolonged non-access to food) 
and ‘hunger’ (its physiological consequence) were accompanied 
and gradually displaced by the multispectral one of food security, 
which is concerned with fundamental dietary needs and minimal 
levels of trade freedom and purchasing power as to satisfy said 
needs. 142   Following an eloquent endorsement by the U.N. 
Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, 143  in 2005 the World Leaders’ Summit concluded that 
“[e]ach individual State has the responsibility to protect its 
population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity,”144  and that should a State manifestly fail to 
ensure such protection, the international community would be 
entitled to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to make recourse 
to any means deemed appropriate in order to prevent those listed 
atrocities from occurring. 145   This newly developed doctrine, 
articulated in three pillars,146  rephrased as an obligation of result,147  
 
ncern_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TNF-A2N8]; see also Anne Orford, Moral 
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AND NEW MULTILATERALISMS 129, 137–39 (David R. Black & Timothy M. Shaw eds., 
2006). 
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2005). 
 145 Id. ¶ 139. 
 146 See Fiammetta Borgia, The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine: Between Criticisms 
and Inconsistencies, 2 J. ON USE OF FORCE & INT’L L. 223, 224–26 (2015). 
 147 This is possibly the highest achievement of the R2P codification, although it is 
rarely analyzed in literature. With the R2P, when a State fails to provide security and 
widespread violations of human dignity are being executed, the international community 
reserves the right to intervene even militarily as to relieve the population’s suffering. 
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is the say, the State was mandated to operate under prevention policies, regardless of the 
latter’s eventual effectiveness; in the pre-R2P era, if a domestic genocide occurred 
nonetheless, the international community was not authorized to intervene (if not 
diplomatically) without the express consent of the host government. See, e.g., Carsten 
Stahn, Syria and the Semantics of Intervention, Aggression and Punishment: On ‘Red 
Lines’ and ‘Blurred Lines’, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 955, 964 (2013) (addressing the non-
punitive dimension of R2P, in the context of R2P’s focus on rescuing civilians from 
massive violations of their dignity and rights). 
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erga omnes, 148   and subsequently recognised by the UNSC, 149  
cannot yet be understood as having the binding force of customary 
rules,150  especially in view of the disagreement over the response to 
the ‘Arab Spring’ in Libya and Syria151  between key agents such as 
the US, China, Russia, India, Brazil, and the European Union.152  To 
be sure, the R2P had already failed its test prior to the Arab Spring, 
in Darfur, where despite “the creation of famine formed part of a 
criminal plan to take control over certain areas […] through the 
commission of genocidal acts and various crimes against 
humanity,”153  the R2P was employed as a chilling argument against 
intervention rather than as a catalysing factor.154  The optimistic 
humanitarianism of just few years before backfired, annihilated by 
revamped concerns over “the militarisation of humanitarian aid as a 
 
 148 See Hovhannes Nikoghosyan, Government Failure, Atrocity Crimes and the Role 
of the International Criminal Court: Why Not Syria, but Libya, 19 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1240, 
1243-44 (2015). 
 149 See Zifcak, supra note 123, at 495. 
 150 See Marco Longobardo, Genocide, Obligations Erga Omnes, and the 
Responsibility to Protect: Remarks on a Complex Convergence, 19 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 
1199, 1203 (2015). 
 151 See Zifcak, supra note 123, at 500–5; see also Rebecca Barber, Is Security Council 
Authorisation Really Necessary to Allow Cross-Border Humanitarian Assistance in 
Syria?, EJIL:TALK! (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/is-security-council-
authorisation-really-necessary-to-allow-cross-border-humanitarian-assistance-in-syria 
[https://perma.cc/J74E-ASLA] (discussing alternative legal options available in the Syrian 
dossier). Still on Syria, but with reference to the most recent Euro-American strikes in 
response to alleged chemical attacks by the al-Assad’s regime on the civilian population, 
see generally Agata Klęczkowska, The Illegality of Humanitarian Intervention: The Case 
of the UK’s Legal Position Concerning the 2018 Strikes in Syria, 35 UTRECHT J. INT’L & 
EUR. L. 35 (2020). 
 152 See Sankaralingam Pandiaraj, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Reflections on the 
Legal Status of the Doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, 15 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 795, 811–
12 (2016); see also Zheng Chen & Hang Yin, China and Russia in R2P Debates at the UN 
Security Council, 96 INT’L AFFS. 787, 788 (2020); ANDREA S. KOLB, THE UN SECURITY 
COUNCIL MEMBERS’ RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 365–68 (2017).  See 
generally YANG RAZALI KASSIM, THE GEOPOLITICS OF INTERVENTION: ASIA AND THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2014). 
 153 Randle C. DeFalco, Conceptualizing Famine as a Subject of International 
Criminal Justice: Towards a Modality-Based Approach, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1113, 1127 
(2017). 
 154 See Phil C. Orchard, Regime-Induced Displacement and Decision-Making Within 
the United Nations Security Council: The Cases of Northern Iraq, Kosovo, and Darfur, in 
PROTECTING THE DISPLACED: DEEPENING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 101, 121–2 
(Sara E. Davies & Luke Glanville eds., 2010). 
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form of global governance.”155  Then, the more pessimistic scholars 
argued that “[v]ictims of systemic human rights violations [we]re, 
therefore, prey to geopolitics, as they were prior to the establishment 
of R2P”. 156   In fairness, humanitarian aid had always been 
militarised and, consequently, politicised;157  the R2P was simply an 
attempt at systematising its practice158  whilst providing it with an 
authoritative legal mandate grounded in positive law.  This attempt 
seemingly failed, but resuming to mere politics is no longer an 
option, either.  That States “are free to make moral choices” 159  
lawfully (or at least, like during the pre-R2P ‘political humanitarian’ 
 
 155 Kjersti Lohne & Kristin Bergtora Sandvik, Bringing Law into the Political 
Sociology of Humanitarianism, 4 OSLO L. REV. 4, 8 (2017). 
 156 AIDAN HEHIR, HOLLOW NORMS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 11 (2019). 
 157 See Saira Mohamed, Restructuring the Debate on Unauthorized Humanitarian 
Intervention, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1305–11 (2010). 
 158 Contra Emily Paddon Rhoads & Jennifer Welsh, Close Cousins in Protection: The 
Evolution of Two Norms, 95 INT’L AFFS. 597, 601–03 (2019).  Their analysis is 
geopolitically insightful yet legally flawed. We disagree profoundly that R2P “was 
deliberately institutionalized at the 2005 [W]orld [S]ummit as a political rather than a legal 
principle” or “positioned as a reinforcer of established legal obligations related to atrocity 
crimes.” If it was institutionalized, that is exactly because politics was not deemed 
sufficient anymore. Id. at 601, 603.  Moreover, the atrocity-crimes-related obligations the 
Authors are speaking about were anything but ‘established’ in terms of public international 
law that regulates the use of force between sovereigns; they were, in fact, simply criminal 
norms transposed at the international level, yet fundamentally concerning individuals (or 
at best, human rights norms, but still nothing to do with international security laws).  
Premised on these disagreements, we also cannot join the Authors in their argument that 
“[p]roponents of R2P did not seek to create new law, but rather to enhance compliance 
with [S]tates’ existing legal commitments.” If States now “invoke the morally charged 
concept of responsibility primarily as a means to summon up political will, rather than to 
establish a concrete plan of action,” that is again a shame for world politics—whose 
representatives ignore history of international relations as magistra vitae — and not the 
evidence of an R2P failure to deliver legal novelty per se.  Id.  See Jessica Almqvist, 
Enforcing the Responsibility to Protect Through Solidarity Measures, 19 INT’L J. HUM. 
RTS. 1002, 1008 (2015) (arguing that the R2P codified a legal route towards military 
intervention, and arguably broadened the scope of state failures to be redressed, which 
went further than the generic duties of cooperation in terminating breaches of humanitarian 
law which had already been established by both the International Court of Justice and the 
International Law Commission); see also Pinar Gözen Ercan, Responsibility to Protect and 
Inter-State Crises: Why and How R2P Applies to the Case of Gaza, 19 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 
1098, 1102 (2015) (discussing how, before the R2P was introduced, most States were 
already responsible for protecting their own citizens (more or less comprehensively), but 
from a legal standpoint they could not be sanctioned militarily for their failure to do so). 
 159 DAVID CHANDLER, CONSTRUCTING GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: MORALITY AND 
POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 59 (2004). 
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phase, not definitely unlawfully) has never been falser and more 
idealistic a statement. 
IV. Fitting R2P’s ‘Crimes List’ in the Burundian Civil Conflict 
Political scientists define after-independence Burundi as a rebel-
to-ruler post-war militarization society. 160   Recent Burundian 
history, shaped by the unabating ethnic-motivated conflict between 
Hutu and Tutsi groups 161   and by the instability characterising 
Africa’s Great Lakes region,162  can be sorted163  into three periods: 
the civil war lasting approximately from 1993 to 2005, identifiable 
as non-international armed conflict (“NIAC”);164  the two claimed-
lawful Pierre Nkurunziza’s terms as president of the country; and 
the civil unrest erupted again in 2015 following Nkurunziza’s 
decision to run for a third mandate, 165   despite Burundi’s own 
constitutional provisions. The first period, characterised by 
dynamics comparable to those of the neighbouring Rwanda, 166  
featured a continued alternation of Hutu and Tutsi regimes, such 
that it is virtually impossible to submit that one majoritarian party 
 
 160 See, e.g., Andrea Purdeková, Filip Reyntjens & Nina Wilén, Militarisation of 
Governance After Conflict: Beyond the Rebel-to-Ruler Frame – The Case of Rwanda, 39 
THIRD WORLD Q. 158, 160 (2018). 
 161 See Rowan Popplewell, Civil Society, Hybridity and Peacebuilding in Burundi: 
Questioning Authenticity, 40 THIRD WORLD Q. 129, 134 (2019). 
 162 See e.g., S.C. Res. 1653 (Jan. 27, 2006). 
 163 ‘Slightly’ simplistic, yet hopefully, clearly enough for the purposes of the present 
analysis. Keeping these dates in mind is essential to appreciate the conflict-hunger 
relationship illustrated infra. 
 164 For the application of the R2P principle to this first phase, see SUSAN C. BREAU, 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN EMERGING PARADIGM SHIFT 
221–24 (2016). 
 165 See Rossalyn Warren, ‘Fake News’ Fuelled Civil War in Burundi. Now It’s Being 
Used Again, GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/28 
/burundi-fake-news-fuelled-civil-war-used-again-resident-nkurunziza 
[https://perma.cc/498N-TYEE]. President Nkurunziza died on June 8, 2020, possibly due 
to Covid-19.  See David Pilling & Andres Schipani, Coronavirus Stalks Burundi’s 
Political Elite After President’s Death, FIN. TIMES (June 15, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/a232c62b-ded1-4dd4-8ca7-a5bb5214987f 
[https://perma.cc/6KF6-UJ26]. 
 166 See Noel Twagiramungu, Burundi: The Anatomy of Mass Violence Endgames, in 
HOW MASS ATROCITIES END: STUDIES FROM GUATEMALA, BURUNDI, INDONESIA, SUDAN, 
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, AND IRAQ 56, 74 (Bridget K. Conley-Zilkic ed., 2016); see also 
CHARLES T. ‘CHUCK’ CALL, WHY PEACE FAILS: THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF CIVIL 
WAR RECURRENCE 150–60 (2012). 
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committed crimes against the other minority party. 167   In other 
words, while crimes were committed, it is hard to assess which party 
they primarily belong to, as well as to univocally identify specific 
individuals to charge with those crimes. 168   However, both 
investigations become possible vis-à-vis the third period, when not 
only the repressive actions can be attributed to the choices of one 
precise person (Mr. Nkurunziza), but also, such repression is 
targeted against Tutsi rebels by the Hutu ruler.169  Resultantly, the 
case at hand displays a minority persecuted by a majority, and 
criminal actions carried out in this framework can fall under the 
rubric of both genocide (“acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”)170  
and crimes against humanity (“acts when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack”).171  Large-scale RTF 
violations are here at play,172  namely as “serious bodily or mental 
harm to members of the group”173  in the case of genocide, or under 
the category of “extermination” 174   relevant for crimes against 
humanity. More specifically, ‘extermination’ includes the 
“intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation 
of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the 
destruction of part of a population” 175   especially when such 
‘conditions of life’ include an irreparably damaged natural 
environment, no longer reliable upon for sustenance.176  The non-
 
 167 See id. 
 168 See id. 
 169 See BREAU, supra note 164; see also Jeremy Maron, What Led to the Genocide 
Against the Tutsi in Rwanda?, CAN. MUSEUM FOR HUM. RTS, 
https://humanrights.ca/story/what-led-to-the-genocide-against-the-tutsi-in-rwanda 
[https://perma.cc/W7B6-5FNV] (last visited Oct. 7, 2020). 
 170 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 6, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 38544. 
 171 Id. at art. 7(1). 
 172 See also Human Rights Council, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, 
A/HRC/39/63, ¶¶ 68, 72 (Aug. 8, 2018). 
 173 Id. art. 6(b). 
 174 Id. art 7(1)(b). 
 175 Id. art. 7(2)(b) (emphasis added). 
 176 See Konstantin Kleine, Will R2P Be Ready When Disaster Strikes? – The 
Rationale of the Responsibility to Protect in an Environmental Context, 19 INT’L J. HUM. 
RTS. 1176, 1183–84 (2015). 
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international nature of the conflict precluded the possibility to 
invoke the war crime of starvation under the Rome Statute,177  but 
if Burundi were still a party to the Statute,178  invoking such crime 
would have been a viable option for future occurrences thanks to an 
amendment tabled in December 2019,179  which extends the remit 
of this war crime to NIACs.  Provided that most conflict-triggered 
famines pertain to NIACs and not international conflicts,180  the 
 
 177 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8.2(b)(xxv), July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544 (“Other serious violations of the law and customs applicable 
in international armed conflict . . . namely . . . [i]ntentionally using starvation of civilians 
as a method of warfare.”) (emphasis added); see also Rogier J. Bartels, The Classification 
of Armed Conflicts by International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, 20 INT’L CRIM. L. 
REV. 595, 649 n.268 (2020); Catriona J. Murdoch & Wayne Jordash, Clarifying the 
Contours of the Crime of Starvation, EJIL:TALK! (June 27, 2019), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/clarifying-the-contours-of-the-crime-of-starvation/ 
[https://perma.cc/KV5P-55VD].  See generally Deidre Willmott, Removing the Distinction 
Between International and Non-International Armed Conflict in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, 5 MELB. J. INT’L L. 196, 196–219 (2004) (discussing the 
detrimental limitations of the Rome Statute in differentiating between international and 
non-international armed conflict in addressing war crimes).  Wisely, domestic jurisdictions 
prosecuting war crimes have already disapplied the anachronistic IAC-NIAC distinction.  
See Oona Anne Hathaway et al., What is a War Crime?, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. 53, 99 (2019). 
 178  “Burundi deposited its instrument of ratification to the Rome Statute on 21 
September 2004. Burundi withdrew from the Rome Statute, and the withdrawal took effect 
on 27 October 2017. The ICC may therefore exercise its jurisdiction over crimes listed in 
the Rome Statute committed on the territory of Burundi or by its nationals from 1 
December 2004 to 26 October 2017.” See Burndi: Situation in the Republic of Burundi, 
INT’L CRIM. CT. [ICC], https://www.icc-cpi.int/burundi [https://perma.cc/KB5T-633T] 
(last visited Dec. 7, 2020).  On the political concerns subsumed under the decision by 
certain African jurisdictions to withdraw en masse from the Statute, see Olesya Dovgalyuk 
& Riccardo Vecellio Segate, From Russia and Beyond: The ICC Global Standing, While 
Countries’ Resignation Is Getting Serious, FILODIRITTO, 17-18 (Jan. 16, 2017), 
https://www.filodiritto.com/sites/default/files/articles/documents/0000002222.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/4EFV-Y64Q]. 
 179 Resolution ICC-ASP/18/Res.5 on amendments to article 8 of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, adopted at the 9th plenary meeting, on 6 December 2019, 
by consensus. See Rogier J. Bartels, Time to Fix the Rome Statute and Add the Crime 
of Starvation in Non-International Armed Conflicts!, EJIL:TALK! (Dec. 3, 2019), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/time-to-fix-the-rome-statute-and-add-the-crime-of-starvation-in-
non-international-armed-conflicts/ [https://perma.cc/ZJ3Q-JWDD]. Notably, this 
amendment will not automatically overwrite the obligations under the Statute for all ICC 
members; only those States which will have ratified this particular amendment will be 
bound by it, and not even ipso tempore.  See Kevin Jon Heller, The Rome Statute’s Flawed 
Amendment Regime — Starvation in NIAC Edition, OPINIO JURIS (July 12, 2019), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/12/07/the-rome-statutes-flawed-amendment-regime-
starvation-in-niac-edition/ [https://perma.cc/9JJG-DE4H]. 
 180 For example, in a press conference on humanitarian crises, the UN Secretary-
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amendment is a historical achievement.  Notably, a few domestic 
courts and U.N. agencies already operated the same extension, by 
arguing that starving civilians as a method of warfare was a war 
crime in NIACs too, based on international customary law.181  In 
any case, starvation as a self-standing crime under the Rome Statute, 
including extensive phenomena of hidden hunger, can be traced 
back to “torture,”182  or to “other inhumane acts”183  as a residual 
category of crimes against humanity. 184   As for international 
humanitarian law, it might well serve as an interpretative device to 
international criminal justices,185  but it will not be scrutinised here: 
first, the definitions in international criminal law overlap more 
directly with the four listed criteria for assessing R2P violations;186  
second, the IHL threshold on starvation (pursuant to the 1977 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions), which is tailored 
to the core happening of the hostilities and does not account for their 
roots or legacy, is too high and mere-survival-oriented,187  so much 
that no hidden-hunger phenomena could ever be encompassed.188  
 
General addressed four conflicts, the only international one being that in Yemen.  U.N. 
Secretary-General, Full Transcript of Secretary-General’s Joint Press Conference on 
Humanitarian Crises in Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen (Feb. 22, 2017), 
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2017-02-22/full-transcript-
secretary-generals-joint-press-conference [https://perma.cc/A6VJ-XDXH]. 
 181 See Federica D’Alessandra & Matthew Gillett, The War Crime of Starvation in 
Non-International Armed Conflict, 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 815, 825 (2019). 
 182 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(2)(e), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 38544. 
 183 Id. at art. 7(1)(k). 
 184 Manuel J. Ventura, Prosecuting Starvation Under International Criminal Law: 
Exploring the Legal Possibilities, 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 781, 791–94 (2019). 
 185 See, e.g., KNUT DÖRMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: SOURCES AND COMMENTARY 364–73 (2004). 
 186 Or three, if one considers that ethnic cleansing is not separately criminalised under 
ICL. The other three international crimes elicited to trigger R2P interventions are 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 
 187 See Dapo Akande & Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Conflict Induced Food Insecurity 
and the War Crime of Starvation of Civilians as a Method of Warfare: The Underlying 
Rules of International Humanitarian Law, 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 753, 760–61 (2019). 
 188 Notwithstanding this, support might be retrieved from a doctrinal understanding 
of art. 54(1) of mentioned Protocol, as to encompass starvation “as a […] weapon to 
annihilate or weaken the population[.]”  See Claude Pilloud & Jean Simon Pictet, Art. 54, 
in COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 § 2090 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno 
Zimmermann eds., 1987) (emphasis added). 
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What is more, civil conflicts do not fit the (possibly obsolete) 
rationale of these IHL provisions, as the latter perpetuate a clear 
watershed between civilians and combatants, which is untenable 
amid irregular, non-traditional conflicts,189  while the former are 
often traversed by ‘rebel,’ ‘terrorist,’ ‘mercenary,’ ‘partisan,’ or 
‘paramilitary’ forces which IHL would not comprehend among 
lawful combatants.190 
Daily life in contemporary Burundi is destabilised by a tangle 
of land claims across families and tribes, owing to multi-phase 
internal displacement but also “resulting from grabbing 
[‘expropriation’] of public land by military and state 
representatives.” 191   Indeed, this is a textbook example of what 
recent literature labels as ‘post-conflict authoritarian governance,’ 
whereby ‘frozen conflicts’ are not solved and peacefully ‘left 
behind’ but only trapped in a prolonged state of stand-by which 
alternates violent outbreaks with spatial coercion, movement 
restrictions, hyper-surveillance, top-down property redistribution, 
and more generally, illiberal military practices of conflict sectarian 
pseudo-management. 192   Because economic rights encourage the 
developmental emancipation that jointly with full and free political 
standing, leads to self-determination,193  conflicts—especially civil 
ones—are unlikely to reach a settlement if the fighters neglect the 
population’s nutritional needs.  As for Burundi, since the revival of 
protracted low-intensity conflict grounded on ethnical hatred has 
been causing acts of genocide and crimes against humanity linked 
 
 189 See id. at 764 (“[I]t is permissible/not prohibited to attack objects indispensable to 
the survival of the civilian population, such as crops for example, if in fact they are used 
exclusively by enemy armed forces.”). 
 190 See Hutter, supra note 73, at 738–39. 
 191 Matthijs Van Leeuwen et al., The ‘Local Turn’ and Notions of Conflict and 
Peacebuilding – Reflections on Local Peace Committees in Burundi and Eastern DR 
Congo, 8 PEACEBUILDING 279, 286 (2020). 
 192 See David G. Lewis, John Heathershaw & Nick Megoran, Illiberal Peace? 
Authoritarian Modes of Conflict Management, 53 COOPERATION & CONFLICT 486, 489 
(2018); see also David G. Lewis & Saniya Sagnayeva, Corruption, Patronage and Illiberal 
Peace: Forging Political Settlement in Post-Conflict Kyrgyzstan, 41 THIRD WORLD Q., 77, 
80, 85–6, 89 (2019). 
 193 See PATRICK MACKLEM, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 61 (2015).  
Remarkably, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has asserted that the 
legal significance of development invests its double implications as a means and as an end 
in itself. See Simeon A. Igbinedion, Finding Value for the Right to Development in 
International Law, 19 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 395, 404 (2019). 
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to the starvation of the ethnic minority concerned, which is being 
forced to flee the country 194   owing to violence and extreme 
hunger,195  R2P might be legitimately invoked by the international 
community. Put differently, famine owing to natural calamity or 
other unforeseeable disasters cannot fall within the R2P remit, 
whilst state-provoked starvation might be, depending on the 
circumstances, such as the configuration of the relevant ongoing 
conflict.196  The link between insufficient food and the likeness of 
civil conflicts erupting has been proven,197  so that the intersection 
between insufficient and inadequate food triggers uncontrollable 
cycles of misery and brutality. 198   Legally speaking, however, 
complicity and indifference shall be distinguished.199  Borrowing 
 
 194 See Anna Dubuis, Burundi’s Last Civil War Killed 300,000. A New One Is 
Coming, WORLD (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-03-28/burundi-s-last-
civil-war-killed-300000-new-one-coming [https://perma.cc/N8UH-NUNH]; Schmid, 
supra note 3, at 533 (discussing the implications of state-sponsored creation of severe 
living conditions that may satisfy the definition of a war crime). 
 195 See LAURIE FIELDS DEROSE ET AL., WHO’S HUNGRY? AND HOW DO WE KNOW? 
FOOD SHORTAGE, POVERTY, AND DEPRIVATION 168 (1998). 
In the 1990s in sub-Saharan Africa, food shortage prevailed in cases of active 
conflict, such as Angola, southern Sudan, and Somalia – where all sides in the 
conflicts used food and hunger as political tools – and in Rwanda, Burundi, and, 
to a lesser extent, Kenya – where those driven by violence from their homes faced 
both immediate and longer-term food shortages because they could not return to 
plant their crops. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 196 See Schmid, supra note 3, at 533. 
 197 See Henk-Jan Brinkman & Cullen S. Hendrix, Occasional Paper No. 24: Food 
Insecurity and Violent Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Addressing the Challenges, 
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, 5–6, 12–14 (July 2011), 
https://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/newsroom/wfp238358.pdf?
_ga=2.252583691.323270531.1600017816-1633554099.1600017816 
[https://perma.cc/T5UX-8HV2].  See generally Henk-Jan Brinkman & Cullen S. Hendrix, 
Food Insecurity and Conflict Dynamics: Causal Linkages and Complex Feedbacks, 2 
STABILITY, INT’L J. SEC. & DEV. 1 (2013). 
 198 See Charles Patrick Martin-Shields & Wolfgang Stojetz, Food Security and 
Conflict: Empirical Challenges and Future Opportunities for Research and Policy Making 
on Food Security and Conflict, 119 WORLD DEV. 150, 155–56 (2018). 
 199 “While omissions can indeed be purposive and intended to achieve certain sinister 
goals  . . .  a humanitarian intervention in such an instance would necessarily either be 
aimed at forcing the government to take action to help its suffering people or intended as 
punishment for failure to take appropriate action.  Such a prescription is highly 
problematic  . . .  for two reasons.  First, if people are suffering because their government 
failed to protect them  . . .  one must seriously question how probable it is that this 
government would be more likely to do so after it was attacked militarily or exactly how 
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from the horrific situation in Yemen,200  issues often arise due to the 
difficulties in asserting a causal nexus, given that “the causal link 
between action and outcome may not be clear enough to establish 
beyond reasonable doubt that remote military or political actors are 
responsible.” 201   Several reports would indirectly support such 
nexus, where they prove a scientific correlation between levels of 
hunger over time and political processes.202  A large-sample study 
revealed that in the period 2008-2017, 54.6% was the projected 
percentage of stunted children in Burundi, which would have ranked 
it overall as the most hunger-prone country in Sub-Saharan Africa203  
and probably worldwide; nevertheless, in order to identify the 
interfaces between conflict and hunger, one shall look closer at the 
timeline while following the evolution of both unrest and 
malnutrition.  For instance, although the population of Burundi 
 
this would help the people who are in dire need of assistance. Second, condoning military 
intervention against states whose people are made to suffer because of incompetent or 
otherwise indifferent leadership leads to the familiar problem of lowering the bar for 
military intervention, while also establishing yet another humanitarian pretext for war.” 
ERIC A. HEINZE, WAGING HUMANITARIAN WAR: THE ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS OF 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 48–49 (2009).  We disagree with the first argument when 
the problem is acute hunger, but it might have a holding when the problem is hidden hunger 
instead, because its protracted nature would call for long-term corrective actions de facto 
equating to military occupation with no expiration date.  As explained in this analysis, 
hidden hunger is as serious as hunger’s acute manifestations, therefore our disagreement 
relates to matters of time and not to arguable ‘disproportions’ between the problem and 
the response thereto. 
 200 See Griffin Paul Jackson, Starvation Is a Weapon, SLATE (Sept. 12, 2019), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/09/starvation-war-crime-syria-yemen-icc.html 
[https://perma.cc/D4AS-XTA5] (“Famines . . . are harder to pin to criminal behavior.”). 
 201 Catriona J. Murdoch & Wayne Jordash, Will Seven Million Starving Yemenis Ever 
Find Justice?, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 2, 2017), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/million-starving-yemenis-find-justice-
171002080456552.html [https://perma.cc/4993-7FCG] (emphasis added); cf. Jeffrey S. 
Bachman, A ‘Synchronised Attack’ on Life: The Saudi-Led Coalition’s ‘Hidden and 
Holistic’ Genocide in Yemen and the Shared Responsibility of the US and UK, 40 THIRD 
WORLD Q. 298, 298–310 (2019) (explaining possible links contributing to genocide).  On 
the Yemeni crisis and its international legal implications, see generally Waseem Ahmad 
Qureshi, The Crisis in Yemen: Armed Conflict and International Law, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 
227 (2020). 
 202 See, e.g., Martin-Shields & Stojetz, supra note 198, at 154–60 (explaining links 
between political processes and food insecurity). 
 203 See Michael Ekholuenetale et al., Socioeconomic Inequalities in Hidden Hunger, 
Undernutrition, and Overweight Among Under-Five Children in 35 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Countries, 95 J. EGYPTIAN PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, 1, 4 (2020). 
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seven years ago was still the most starving on earth204  and Burundi 
witnessed the world-highest increase in child-hunger rate from 
1990-2000,205  the peace transition reversed the trend206  and placed 
the country on the right track (as measured by the Global Hunger 
Index (GHI), which is “more closely associated with hidden hunger 
than FAO’s undernourishment indicator” as it “shows statistically 
significant correlations with measures of hidden hunger”).207  The 
Burundian government even joined the global Scaling Up Nutrition 
initiative in 2013 and drafted a technical nutrition strategic plan in 
2014.208  It was too fragile an improvement, however, to be able to 
survive another setback into violence:209  policymakers should not 
 
 204 See INT’L FOOD POL’Y RES. INS., WELTHUNGERHILFE & CONCERN WORLDWIDE, 
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Messer & Marc J. Cohen, FCND Discussion Paper No. 206: Conflict, Food Insecurity, 
and Globalization, INT’L FOOD POL’Y RES. INS.,  6 (May 2016), 
http://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/37127/filename/37128.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z5RU-3VRH]; id. at 12, n. 6 (showing Burundi’s food insecurity in 
2002-2003 and explaining the role of food insecurity in Burundi and other countries). 
 205 See J. Craig Jenkins, Stephen J. Scanlan & Lindsey Peterson, Military Famine, 
Human Rights, and Child Hunger: A Cross-National Analysis, 1990-2000, 51 J. CONFLICT 
RESOL., 823, 828 (2007). 
 206 See 2014 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX, supra note 204, at 14; id. at 41, 44 (providing 
data underlying the calculations of the 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2014 global hunger 
index scores). 
 207 2014 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX, supra note 204, at 15; cf. Sumithra Muthayya et al., 
The Global Hidden Hunger Indices and Maps: An Advocacy Tool for Action, 8 PLOS ONE 
1, 5 fig. 2 (2013) (depicting hidden hunger index across the world). 
 208 See Emmanuel Nene Odjidja, 2030 Countdown to Combating Malnutrition in 
Burundi: Comparison of Proactive Approaches for Case Detection and Enrolment into 
Treatment, INT’L HEALTH 1, 2 (2020). 
 209 For the latest downturns to violence, see Rick Noack, The U.N. Just Appealed for 
More Humanitarian Funds Than Ever Before. Here’s Why., WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/12/01/the-u-n-just-
appealed-for-more-humanitarian-funds-than-ever-before-heres-why/ 
[https://perma.cc/F8CM-PQ6J].  Compare Elsa Buchanan, Burundi Opposition Claims 
Government Is Using Hunger as a ‘Weapon of Mass Destruction,’ INT’L BUS. TIMES, 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-opposition-claims-government-using-hunger-weapon-
mass-destruction-1619166 [https://perma.cc/DC5X-KTEY] (last updated Apr. 28, 2017), 
with Klaus Kraemer, Trends Show Where to Focus on Hidden Hunger, HUFFPOST, 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-klaus-kraemer/trends-show-where-to-
focu_b_9082752.html [https://perma.cc/F2ZF-F3VE] (last updated Dec. 6, 2017), and 
Hannah McNeish, Wasting Away in Burundi, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 21, 2015), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/02/wasting-burundi-
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be caught off-guard about “patterns of political violence that are 
costly and often repetitive . . . [with] low-income countries plagued 
by long-term malnutrition, low life expectancy and high infant 
mortality.”210  When conflicts ‘go silent’ without ending, hunger 
does not end, either: it ‘goes silent’ too, transiting to a more 
structural and less traceable form, which is indeed hidden hunger 
and hits civilians indiscriminately. 
Moreover, with specific reference to gross violations of the RTF 
actively committed in order to reach genocidal or exterminating 
goals, one additional element must be taken in due account: the 
intentionality of the crime, which is the most unsurmountable 
challenge to any prosecutorial strategy in this field.211  Whilst the 
actus reus component of the crime may be relatively easy to prove, 
the criminal deliberateness of the conduct (mens rea) might prove 
difficult to establish with certainty.212    Proving the mens rea is even 
more demanding when attributing genocidal intentions, because this 
would require a dolus specialis; this difficulty is a fortiori relevant 
in the context of civil unrest outlined above – recrudesced after 
some years of roughly pacific coexistence between the Tutsi and the 
Hutu.213  Remarkably, faced with situations of this kind as well as 
inconclusive evidence, international tribunals have shown a 
cautious degree of willingness to value contextual elements which, 
as a whole, can be deemed indicative of genocidal intent.214 
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return-to-war.html [https://perma.cc/7JQX-SYGR]. 
 210 Frank Haldemann & Akossia Rachelle Kouassi, Transitional Justice Without 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights?, in CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 498, 498 (Eibe H. Riedel, Gilles Giacca & 
Christophe Golay eds., 2014) (emphasis added). 
 211 See Wayne Jordash, Catriona J. Murdoch & Joe Holmes, Strategies for 
Prosecuting Mass Starvation, 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 849, 854, 864 (2019). 
 212 Id. at 853–54. 
 213 See id. at 853–54, 864. 
 214 See NASOUR KOURSAMI, THE ‘CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS’ OF THE CRIME OF 
GENOCIDE 183–87 (2018).  On situational appraisals concerning the crime of starvation 
more generally, see GLOB. RTS. COMPLIANCE & WORLD PEACE FOUND., THE CRIME OF 
STARVATION AND METHODS OF PROSECUTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 16–19 (2019), 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Legal%20Paper%20Starvation.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3RNF-FPMM]. 
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V. North Korea: (Hidden) Hunger as (Silent) Violence 
Given the State party’s obligation, under article 6 of the [ICCPR], 
to protect the life of its citizens and to take measures to reduce 
infant mortality and increase life expectancy, the Committee 
remains seriously concerned about the lack of measures by the 
State party to deal with the food and nutrition situation in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the lack of measures 
to address, in cooperation with the international community, the 
causes and consequences of the drought  . . .  which seriously 
affected the country’s population in the 1990s.215 
The recent socio-economic history of the Korean peninsula 
somehow resembles that of the ‘two Germanies’ from WWII’s 
aftermath through the 1990s.  After the ceasefire and armistice that 
‘ended’ the Korean War and still through the 1970s, although the 
whole peninsula was devastated, its Northern part recovered faster; 
South Korea was poorer, less industrialised, disadvantaged both 
geographically and agriculturally, and more aid-reliant compared to 
its Northern counterpart.216  Less than half a century later, despite 
its infamously familistic crony conglomerates (chaebols), South 
Korea is a highly advanced, global technological powerhouse, a 
maturing democracy, and an aid donor, while almost the totality of 
households in North Korea suffer from either insufficient food or 
lack of variety thereof;217  at the time of writing, according to the 
United Nations, less than one tenth of North Koreans enjoy 
acceptable food consumption. 218   How could this role-reversal 
happen so quickly?  North Korea is often cited as an exemplification 
of (impending) ‘failed State,’219  as if its institution were not capable 
 
 215 UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ¶ 12 U.N. Doc. 
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 216 Joo-Ho Song & Tae-Jin Kwon, Food Security in the Republic of Korea and the 
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ASIA: WHY INSTITUTIONS MATTER 139, 140 (Zhang-Tue Zhou & Guanghua Wan eds., 
2017). 
 217 See id. at 163–64. 
 218 See Tomás Ojea Quintana (Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights 
in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), Rep. on the Situation of Human Rights in 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ¶ III(A)(7), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/43/58 (Feb. 
25, 2020). 
 219 See, e.g., John Van Benthuysen, In-Between Anarchy and Interdependence: From 
State Death to Fragile and Failing States, 36 THIRD WORLD Q. 22, 31–32 (2015) (“Clearly 
North Korea is a fragile state, indicated by its steady economic deterioration, and a 
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of directing the country’s fate, but this label shall be rejected insofar 
as its dictatorial regime proves to be the attested cause of this State’s 
misfortunes.220  In fact, “[t]he secretive and autocratic North Korean 
regime has been one of the most brutal human rights violators for 
the last six decades,”221  as part of a broader policy design which is 
anything but irrational in light of the regime’s priority of self-
preservation. 222   If one compares it to the unrestrained, 
hyperconfident revolutionary zeal which had blindfolded 
‘Democratic’ Kampuchea’s decision-making in Cambodia, 223  
similarities are astounding.  North Korea’s extremised, hyper-
isolationist form of autarchy did not deliver on its promises, and 
“has been loath to accept the demands of other governments or 
NGOs concerning the production, distribution, and accountability 
of its food system.”224  Food deprivation never happens in a vacuum, 
and the responsibilities of the State in its external and internal affairs 
shall be appraised holistically, in an integrated and cross-functional 
fashion: “a right to food audit should not be limited to examining 
policies and programs and should include the legal structures behind 
food production.” 225   In ‘nourishing’ terms, the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea’s (“DPRK”) responsibilities for human 
rights violations mainly lie in three policies: 1) the sluggish, 
negligent, or even obstructed dispensation of international (food) 
aid, the acceptance of which burns political capital226  but shall be 
 
candidate for future state failure”). 
 220 Charles T. ‘Chuck’ Call, The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State,’ 29 THIRD WORLD Q. 
1491, 1504 (2008). 
 221 BANTEKAS & OETTE, supra note 2, at 185. See generally Roberta Cohen, Human 
Rights in North Korea: Addressing the Challenges, 22 INT’L J. KOR. UNIFICATION STUD. 
29, 29–62 (2013) (discussing the grave human rights abuses present in North Korea and 
the diverse approaches needed to solve the problem). 
 222 See Andrei Yamamoto, Unpacking the Ontological Foundation of North Korea’s 
Ambivalent Foreign Policy: Brinkmanship as Rationality, 11 ASIAN POL. & POL’Y 356, 
359–60 (2019). 
 223 See MAARTJE WEERDESTEIJN, THE RATIONALITY OF DICTATORS: TOWARDS A MORE 
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 224 John Feffer, North Korea and the International Politics of Famine, 4 ASIA-PAC. J. 
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METHODS IN HUMAN RIGHTS: A HANDBOOK 333, 348 (Bård A. Andreassen et al. eds., 
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approved nonetheless; 2) the collectivised exploitation of cultivable 
soil;227  and 3) the exasperated restrictions to the free movements of 
people and goods,228  whose lifting is often contingent upon bribing 
officials229 – indeed, “people who live in authoritarian regimes can 
buy private space through the payment of bribes”.230  To this list, 
one may add the military overspending, 231   the indiscriminately 
 
the Enemy: Linking Development and Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula, 29 PAC. 
REV. 473, 481–4 (2016);  see also Mika Aaltola, Emergency Food Aid as a Means of 
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politics. 
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[https://perma.cc/LD46-7RCT]; STEPHAN HAGGARD & MARCUS NOLAND, FAMINE IN 
NORTH KOREA: MARKETS, AID, AND REFORM 169–70 (2009). The problem with the third 
policy lies in its extent, as its contrary (a total deregulation of the supply chains and 
financialization of the commodities’ exchange price and trade, in accordance with the 
neoliberal economic approach) has already proven to be detrimental to a fair distribution 
of nutritional resources at the global level. 
 229 See JUSTIN V. HASTINGS, A MOST ENTERPRISING COUNTRY: NORTH KOREA IN THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 92 (2016); OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R HUM. RTS., THE PRICE IS 
RIGHTS: THE VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING IN THE 
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA 2 (2019), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/KP/ThePriceIsRights_EN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LAW5-NF6C]; Sang-Hun Choe, Fleeing North Korea is Becoming 
Harder, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/05/world/asia/ 
crackdowns-make-fleeing-north-korea-harder.html [https://perma.cc/9FJW-PKWM]; 
Soo-Am Kim, et al., Relations Between Corruption and Human Rights in North Korea, 
KOR. INST. NAT’L UNIFICATION 29–30 (2013), http://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/ 
2015.oak/2239/1/0001458992.pdf [https://perma.cc/FAQ7-R5GB]. 
 230 Philip M. Nichols, The Good Bribe, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 647, 675 (2015). 
 231 See Serena Timmoneri, Responsibility to Protect and ‘Peacetime Atrocities’: The 
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aggressive and centrally planned (i.e., compelled on farmers) 
fertilisation of the soil which degraded the nutritional value of 
agricultural products over extensive contaminated lands,232  as well 
as—mirroring Palestine’s vicious cycle—restrictions to people’s 
movements 233   internationally, but also domestically. 234   Not 
satisfied with starving its own citizens, the North Korean regime 
disregards its PIL obligation235  to, for instance, release passports 
and smoothen the opening of ‘humanitarian’ corridors as to let 
North Koreans escape famine (either temporarily or permanently) 
through lawful emigration, provided third States are willing to 
welcome them as either refugees or ‘economic migrants.’236  These 
policies combined have been defined as the ‘silent violence’ 
 
Case of North Korea, 19 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1290, 1297 (2015). 
 232 See Christine Ahn, Famine and the Future of Food Security in North Korea, INST. 
FOOD & DEV. POL’Y, 5–8 (May 2005), https://foodfirst.org/wp-
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 233 See AMNESTY INT’L, STARVED OF RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FOOD CRISIS IN 
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (NORTH KOREA) 16 (2004), 
https://www.Amnesty.Org/Download/Documents/96000/Asa240032004en.pdf 
[https://perma.Cc/4auj-Z3sh]. 
 234 See Timmoneri, supra note 231, at 1294 (describing how “forced internal 
resettlement is routine” and access to Pyongyang is “tightly restricted”). 
 235 This obligation stems from art. 12(2) ICCPR; the DPRK ratified the ICCPR in 
1981 to then attempt to withdraw from it in 1997, yet said treaty does not provide for 
withdrawal options, therefore the other state parties still consider the DPRK to be a 
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provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), 
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in turn, by the same art. 12(3) in that they shall be “consistent with the other rights 
recognized in the […] Covenant”. Among the latter, that to life (art. 6(1)) and, most 
relevantly for hidden hunger, that not to be subjected to degrading treatment (art. 7); 
furthermore, unqualifiedly, “[i]n no case may a people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence” (art. 1(2)). 
 236 See generally Jiyoung ‘Jay’ Song, Twenty Years’ Evolution of North Korean 
Migration, 1994–2014: A Human Security Perspective, 2 ASIA & PAC. POL’Y STUD. 399 
(2015). See China’s Repatriation of North Korean Refugees: Hearing Before the Cong.-
Executive Comm’n on China, 112th Cong. 5 (2012) (transcript available at 
https://chrissmith.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2012.03.05_chinas_repatriation_of_north_kor
ean_refugees.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SGX-HEKU]); Stephy Kwan, More Than an 
Ignorant Bystander: Chinese Accountability and the Repatriation of North Korean 
Defectors, 26 INT’L J. KOR. UNIFICATION STUD. 95 (2017); Jeanyoung Jeannie Cho, 
Systemizing the Fate of the Stateless North Korean Migrant: A Legal Guide to Preventing 
the Automatic Repatriation of North Korean Migrants in China, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
175 (2013). 
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underlying interstitial mass starvation: top-down suicidal missions 
of “titanic social engineering [as] attempts at agro-economic 
transformation.” 237   Another policy to be considered is what is 
termed as ‘penal starvation,’ which entails starving prisoners to 
death (by choice, indifference, and/or incompetence): 
[t]he North Korean regime is responsible not only for famine, but 
also for a deliberate policy of subjecting its prisoners to starvation 
rations.  . . .  Food is allocated on the basis of productivity: the 
less a prisoner produces, the less he eats, resulting in a spiral 
downward as those deprived of even more food produce less and 
less. Many in the camps die from lack of food, while some are 
executed for foraging. Penal starvation does not cause death in the 
manner  . . .  in which malnutrition spreads over wide populations. 
Rather, it attacks a significant percentage of prisoners who cannot 
live on rations constantly below subsistence level, or whose food 
rations are even lower than the prescribed below-subsistence level 
because they do not work hard enough or have angered the 
authorities in some other way. Estimates of how many people are 
in the prison camps at any time vary, but most sources agree on 
about 200,000 every year.238 
The convergence of all of these elements is culpably worsening a 
humanitarian disaster of catastrophic proportions, where not only 
about a million adults died and cannibalism resurged,239  but half of 
all children could not be fed correctly240  and sixty percent of them, 
just two decades ago, were stunted.241  Indeed, “lack of access to 
food is almost never the result of a general scarcity of food. Instead, 
people are deprived of food because they have no opportunity to 
produce it, cannot earn a sufficient income to buy the food they need 
or are unable to work at all.” 242   Even when they produce it, 
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corrupted redistribution policies and relational privileges within 
society make North Koreans’ starvation a deliberate political act of 
disempowerment, 243   enforced by a ruthless regime that “held 
rigidly to a self-destructive agricultural system.”244  Those who are 
audaceous enough try to access dark markets, which paved the 
foundation for higher rates of disloyalty towards the rulers.245 
Two competing narratives seek to describe different States’ 
approach to the problem of food production and distribution. The 
first, which is dominant and market-driven, is known as ‘globalist 
neoliberal,’ encoding “an emphasis on food production, 
technological solutions, privatisation, and strong corporate 
influence.” The second, which is mostly communist, is known as 
‘food sovereignty,’ placing “an emphasis on access to and 
distribution of food, local production, and strong opposition to the 
privatisation and corporatisation of the food system.” 246  
Counterintuitively, perverse mechanism make the two narratives 
coincide in contemporary DPRK. Prima facie, one might be 
tempted to leverage on the communist, 247   state-driven North 
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Korean case to disprove the increasingly mainstreamed argument of 
all those who claim that food crises and shortages globe-wide 
mostly owe to West-modelled neoliberal market forces’ “emphasis 
on privatisation, deregulation and, crucially, commodification.”248  
Nonetheless, said conclusion would be misleading insofar as the 
“profitable capital accumulation by transnational economic élites” 
is not absent in regimes like the North Korean one.249  It is hyper-
concentrated in the hands of a few rulers and related population 
strata 250   who employ propaganda-supported pseudo-egalitarian 
discourses to keep the (largely majoritarian) rest of the population 
underfed and underdeveloped.251  These authoritarian ‘leaders’ thus 
have no interest in distributing across the citizens (by means of 
accountable policy implementation) all the benefits of their share of 
transnational capital-accumulation mechanisms which occur along 
globalised food supply-chains; North Korean ‘leadership’ prefers 
“to sacrifice the rights — and lives — of those it perceives as 
disloyal or class enemies,”252  and more generally of all those who 
are not double-stranded with and ‘useful to’ the power-élite.253 
 
Socialism in North Korea: A Comparative Perspective, 12 J. ASIA PAC. ECON. 188, 199-
201 (2007). 
 248 Paul O’Connell, The Death of Socio-Economic Rights, 74 MOD. L. REV. 532, 535 
(2011). 
 249 Id. at 536; see also Note by the President of the Security Council, S/2017/150, ¶¶ 
210–55 (Feb. 27, 2017).  See generally CTR. FOR ADVANCED DEF. [C4ADS] & 
세종연구소[THE SEJONG INSTITUTE], The Forex Effect: US Dollars, Overseas Networks, 
and Illicit North Korean Finance (2017), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/5a3292079140b73f7
3f92efd/1513263687907/The+Forex+Effect.pdf [https://perma.cc/QUH4-XDXB]; 
Richard S. Tracey, Using the PATRIOT Act to Turn North Korea’s Dirty Money into a 
Bargaining Chip, 3 STRATEGIC STUD. Q. 124 (2009). 
 250 See Haggard & Noland, supra note 228, at 56, 74. 
 251 See John M. Friend, A Cultural Neuroscience Perspective on North Korean 
Strategic Culture: Implications for Tailored Deterrence, 37 POL. & LIFE SCI. 156, 161 
(2018); Woo-Suk Jun, A Study on the Incapacitation Mechanism Model of the Juchist and 
Marxist-Leninist Articles Against the Core Implementation Mechanism Model of the 
Fundamental Rights Articles in the North Korean Constitution: North Korea’s Violations 
of Fundamental Rights and International Human Rights Treaties 128–31 (Mar. 13, 2014) 
(unpublished S.J.D. Thesis, University of Kansas) (on file with author). 
 252 HUM. RTS. WATCH, NORTH KOREA: A MATTER OF SURVIVAL: THE NORTH KOREAN 
GOVERNMENT’S CONTROL OF FOOD AND THE RISK OF HUNGER 3 (2006), 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/northkorea0506/northkorea0506webwcover.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9YRK-N37G]. 
 253 See ANDREĬ NIKOLAJEWITSCH LAN’KOV, THE REAL NORTH KOREA: LIFE AND 
POLITICS IN THE FAILED STALINIST UTOPIA 115 (2013); Boris Kondoch, The Responsibility 
2021 HIDDEN HUNGER IN PEACETIME AND WARTIME 227 
The country being factually in peace,254  no war crime can be 
attributed to its leaders; also, no specific group is targeted, which 
excludes the possibility to invoke genocide. With reference to the 
R2P, the only relevant attribution would be that for crimes against 
humanity, 255   as civilians are violated arbitrarily. 256   Above-
mentioned precedents in Darfur regrettably set the rule that aid 
obstruction does not suffice for invoking the R2P,257  and North 
Korea was one of the six countries expressing open hostility at the 
principle before the UN.258  Strategic concerns also fall into the 
scheme, adding to the unfeasibility of the R2P option: 
the international community, the US, China, and South Korea all 
agree that their first strategic priority is a stable North Korea that 
does not develop or use nuclear weapons. No [S]tate or 
international organization has invoked the evolving principle of 
the responsibility to protect with regard to North Korea. The 
preferred option appears to be to simply wait for change.259 
Shifting from charges upon state representatives (mainly 
inspected in the case-study on Burundi) to those upon States 
themselves, the most comprehensive framework to be pointed to is 
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the ICESCR one, 260  which calls upon States to “recognize the right 
of everyone to an adequate standard of living  . . .  including 
adequate food” 261   by “recognizing the fundamental right of 
everyone to be free from hunger.”262  The Covenant further specifies 
that “the State may subject [the rights embodied thereof] only to 
such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may 
be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the 
purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic 
society.”263  In the case under examination, neither the society is a 
democratic one (where the objectives of public welfare are more or 
less directly set by the citizens), nor the nature of the RTF shall be 
deemed compatible to any limitation promoting welfare objectives; 
therefore no limitation is applicable. 
The danger of hidden hunger, “caused by eating food that is 
cheap and filling, but deficient in essential vitamins and micro-
nutrients,”264  is always around the corner in dictatorial regimes, as 
they cause restrictions to the circulation of ‘educational wisdom’ 
related to food quality.265  The ICESCR confirms that States “shall 
take . . . measures which are needed to improve methods of 
production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use 
of technical and scientific knowledge[, as for] everyone to . . . enjoy 
the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.”266  Thereby, 
a strict interconnection between the right of non-discrimination in 
accessing information and the right to nutrient, healthy, and 
balanced food can be verified,267  just like in Palestine, where all 
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authorised development stakeholders joined forces and translated 
the circulation of informational wisdom “into the Water Sector 
Working Group, a forum for information-sharing between the 
Palestinian Water Authority, donors, and international and local 
implementing agencies, including humanitarian actors.” 268  
International agencies, whose work is obstructed in the DPRK, 
usually play a central role in raising awareness about and socialising 
scientific standards.269  As food quality is intrinsically dependent on 
freedom of movement (of people and goods), prosperity awareness 
bears relevance as well: 
[n]ews of the prosperity of China and South Korea filters into 
North Korea via returned refugees and via traders who smuggled 
videos and DVDs in from China. The more North Koreans 
encounter goods from the global marketplace and visitors from 
the rest of the world, the harder it is for the regime to trumpet its 
nonsensical propaganda about being the best country in the 
world.270 
Furthermore, where post-harvest waste couples with endemic 
poverty, hidden hunger is the most automatic and immediate 
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outcome. 271   “[L]osses occur[ring] within the post-harvest, 
processing and distribution stages of the food chain — likely as a 
result of poor management, refrigeration, and preservation practices 
during storage and transportation [produce disproportionately 
negative effects on]  . . .  micronutrient-rich commodities such as 
fruits, vegetables and animal products,”272  and post-harvest losses 
in North Korea account for half of the total production.273  North 
Korea’s forced insulation from global supply chains, regardless of 
the latter’s own imperfections, is dramatically harming North 
Koreans’ ability to feed themselves correctly, and it is exacerbating 
hidden hunger throughout the country. The chronic anti-
developmental characteristics of the malnutrition affecting DPRK’s 
society and its physiological repercussions on the population 274  
stand as ‘self-contained’ evidence that acute famine exacerbated by 
natural draughts has always been accompanied by long-term hidden 
hunger, caused by the culpable negligence or even the deliberate 
choice of North Korea’s dictators. 
VI. Conclusions 
In the broadest terms, “there is no thought of invoking even the 
most innocuous prescriptions of R2P to respond to massive 
starvation in the poor countries.” 275   At this stage, the 
impracticability of any claim by the international community to 
enjoy a legally grounded power to intervene to counter hidden-
hunger phenomena related to state leaders’ misconduct should 
emerge evidently.  There are two main issues at stake: the first 
concerns the difficulty in objectively identifying one of the four 
R2P-relevant ‘listed crimes’ by establishing a nexus with the RTF 
violation due to a population’s hidden hunger with their related 
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mental element (when applicable); the second originates in the R2P 
focus on preventive (or at least in medias res) interventions 276   
rather than post factum ‘corrective’ interferences with actions which 
took place within a State.  While the first hurdle can somehow be 
overcome, the second must confront itself with blurred field realities 
and hybrid legal-political vindications. In fact, hidden hunger being 
the long-term effect 277   of deeply rooted and multidimensional 
shortages, setting a hic et nunc would be extremely challenging in 
any (wartime or peacetime) context.  Furthermore, it can be argued 
that at least in times of war, the ‘ante-R2P’ regime would have been 
factually more efficient, because vaguer, and as such proner to 
unilateral humanitarianism; this has been demonstrated in multiple 
scenarios, the (unlawful, yet ethically justifiable?) 278   U.S. 
resoluteness reported in Section III being one of them. This is where 
international politics and law more positively come together, in their 
common attempt to ensure that a minimum threshold in the 
protection of human rights is attained. 
Conversely, in insulated legal terms, the R2P represents a 
considerably more permissive framework, shaped by a rough yet 
substantial departure from the ancient sternness of sovereignty. 
Consequently, and taking into consideration that hidden hunger 
remains less straightforwardly addressable within regional human 
rights protection systems,279  there would be reasonably optimistic 
prospects for the agreement and implementation of supplementary 
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measures at the international plane, in line with the change-gear 
inaugurated in New York City in 2005 that somehow 
institutionalised the “emerging global cosmopolitanism of human 
security.”280  However, perhaps unfortunately, the R2P clearly lacks 
political support as it stands now, thus a fortiori when expansions 
of its scope are contemplated. 
To borrow from ‘peace literature,’ what we need in order to 
complexify our understanding of the right to food by freeing it from 
a starvation lexicon, is “a kind of framing knowledge (savoir), 
which is intimately linked to power and enables the more 
superficial, ‘surface’ knowledge of connaissance to make sense.”281  
Connaissance rests itself at the appearance level, content with 
assuming there is no hunger wherever some calories are provided 
and individuals look healthy; 282   savoir digs deeper through the 
structure of society, into the inner texture of power, and argues that 
hunger does exist whenever quality food is not freely accessible.  
This ‘hidden hunger’ concretises with someone’s ill-will; it 
materialises any time the rulers formulate a discourse of coercion 
that impairs economic freedom and societal development.  This 
work has shown the way a discourse of coercion can conceal itself 
under the surface of allegedly different regimes, during wartime or 
peacetime alike, regardless of the legal applicability of the R2P 
framework as it ‘stands’ (does it?) today. 
The present analysis, building on the two opposite yet specular 
case studies of Burundi and North Korea, also demonstrated that the 
well-intentioned agreement over a ‘responsibility to protect,’ if not 
understood against its whole spectrum of unwarranted implications, 
risks backfiring whenever a country’s failure does not (apparently) 
fulfil the paper-based criteria required for intervention.  When no 
framework applies, States politically enjoy wider room for 
manoeuvre, yet as soon as a legal framework is put in place, such a 
room reduces significantly.  With the R2P, “the U.N. projects itself 
as the legitimate guardian of human beings on a global scale, albeit 
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in extreme circumstances of [S]tate failure.”283  Whilst theoretically 
suitable for patent expressions of mass starvation and ‘quantitative’ 
hunger, the R2P framework as it is codified today thus seem ill-
designed for addressing pervasive but ‘discrete’ manifestations of 
‘qualitative’ hunger.  Hidden hunger never manifests itself in 
extreme forms, yet it extremely impairs the health, freedom, and 
future of those who live under such conditions, as much as the 
growth, development, and emancipation of their countries and 
societies.  As of today, not only have “[n]o major treaties [ . . . ] 
made affirmative references to R2P,”284  but pursuing simil-R2P 
interventions, as if R2P was never codified, seems politically too 
risky for any country to consider as an option. Someone empirically 
demonstrated that R2P is anything but shelved,285  yet besides its 
potential reach, in practice it has never proven to be of any added 
value in addressing hunger, even in the latter’s more ‘explicit’ 
manifestations.286 
In conclusion, millions of children, stuck in between the 
previous lack of legal frameworks (as before the R2P) and the 
ambiguities of—and unachieved consensus on—the existing quasi-
legal framework (the R2P itself), will continue to face a dark (if any) 
future at the hand of a subtle, unapparent, and very much avoidable 
condition named ‘hidden hunger.’  Was the necessitas non habet 
legem-phase less defined by law and formalistically constrained, 
and thus, paradoxically, more efficient in protecting them? More 
time and empirical research are needed to seal a definitive answer.287  
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Certainly though, the extemporaneous politics of humanitarianism 
that was once free-riding and fluctuating upon particular interests 
and rhetorical preferences, and that once “received no further 
justification than the functionalist claim to be acting as executive 
agent of the international community,”288  has now been encoded 
and subjected to further forms of international politics, but pseudo-
legalised—thus harder to overcome—ones. States are now obliged 
to elaborate well-rounded justifications for intervening. For the time 
being, (hidden) hunger seems to be the paradigmatic victim of this 
“emergence of ‘political limits’ in a new global space organized by 
a conception of sovereignty rooted in the principle of humanity”.289 
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